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This dissertation consists of three essays on the study of firm and consumer behaviour
motivated by the energy markets. The first chapter studies whether a firm with better
information than their rivals about the customers in the market can use that information
to earn more profits. The second chapter studies whether a profit-maximising firm would
want to induce positive consumption to a consumer that has self-control issues. The
third chapter analyses empirically whether self-control issues can explain the problem of
self-disconnection that persists in prepayment energy meters.
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Introduction
In many market situations, firms face the problem of the heterogeneity of consumers’
tastes or types. Even if a firm knows the distribution, it does not know the type of any
given customer. However, a firm can design a menu of contracts that is an incentive
mechanism in which consumers are induced to reveal their type by their self-selection
in the menu. This dissertation builds on incentive theory from different perspectives,
although not being entirely in the area of incentive theory.
This dissertation uses energy markets as a motivation for the different issues analysed.
Energy markets are surprisingly understudied from an economic point of view and have
been evolving significantly with a number of new problems. Such an example is an
emerging set of information and communication technologies in the electricity sector,
called smart grid, that has allowed for innovative forms of metering. The debate over the
smart grids has deserved a considerable engineering attention, but it is still an open issue
in economic terms. In particular, there is still some debate around the sensitivity of data
on consumers’ energy usage and who should hold this data. Discussions about potential
discriminatory behaviour have already been made by energy regulators. This raises the
question whether it is, in fact, profitable for a firm that has access to consumers’ data
energy usage to share it with particular third parties.
In this context, the first essay, named “Contracting in a market with differential in-
formation”, addresses whether a firm with better information than their rivals about the
customers in the market can use that information to earn more profits. To study the role
x
of information, we introduce a framework of two firms supplying a good composed of
many commodities that compete in prices, which have access to the same technology and
where customers have fixed demand. We are interested in the equilibrium outcomes under
no differential information and under differential information. We show that, under no
differential information, both firms equally share the customers and types of customers,
charge the same payments and obtain zero profits. Under differential information, we as-
sume that access to better information allows the better informed firm to attract specific
customers. Access to better information gives the better informed firm a first customer
contact advantage. The uninformed firm can only offer a menu of tariffs without being
able to pre-identify the customer’s type. Nonetheless, the uninformed firm can access the
market, not allowing the better informed firm to make positive profits. We find that better
information does not give a firm an advantage or disadvantage, that is, it obtains the same
equilibrium profit as the uninformed firm.
Current energy meters, as opposed to smart meters, also present some issues. One of
those is significantly related with prepayment meters which is a payment method where
the payment is made before the actual consumption. That is, consumers have to pay
for electricity and/or gas (immediate costs) before they consume it (delayed benefits).
Moreover, consumers must plan in advance their future consumption. This planning, or
lack of it, may lead to self-disconnection, which happens when consumers exhaust all
available credit in their meter and are left without supply of energy for a certain period.
Self-disconnection has serious consequences for the wellbeing of consumers. Likewise,
it generates costs for the energy suppliers since it may contribute to lower energy con-
sumption, higher debt levels, and higher costs related to reconnection of energy supply.
This self-disconnection can be explained by the presence of self-control issues that can
lead a consumer to under-consume.
Motivated by this problem, the second essay, “Contracting in a market with costly
xi
self-control”, studies theoretically whether a profit-maximising firm would want to in-
duce positive consumption to a consumer that is time-inconsistent and is unaware of his
degree of time inconsistency. The literature on behavioural economics defines this type
of consumer as naïve, in which differs from a sophisticated type in the sense that the latter
is aware of his degree of time inconsistency. The firm/principal cannot observe the type
of the consumer/agent at the contracting stage. In order to make any payment, the agent
needs to make a saving decision and incur a savings effort cost. The agent’s marginal
utility of consumption is affected by a shock after the contracting stage. We study two
specific contract forms: a pay-in-advance contract that involves a payment at date 0 and
a payment at date 1, and a pay-in-advance contract that only involves a payment at date
1. We show that the principal can induce positive consumption to all types, but there
is a trade-off between increasing efficiency and decreasing information rent when offer-
ing a menu of contracts. We also study the impact of the naïve type on the remaining
types’ utilities and on the principal’s expected profit and show that the principal may
have incentives to educate the naïve type.
The final essay, “Addressing self-disconnection among prepayment energy consumers:
A behavioural approach”, analyses empirically whether self-control issues can explain
the problem of self-disconnection that persists in prepayment energy meters. We study
a mechanism composed of a commitment contract and a reminder in order to minimise
the number of self-disconnections. We design and implement a survey to energy con-
sumers that use a prepayment meter in the UK. We show that self-control plays a role
in self-disconnection and we are able to identify, in our sample, those consumers who
benefit from a commitment contract. Moreover, we find a demand for commitment and
an opportunity to save among those consumers who need a commitment contract.
This dissertation builds and expands on the economic literature in three ways. Chap-
ter 1 contributes to the literature on the role of information in oligopolistic markets by
xii
analysing the impact of differential information about the types of customers on equilib-
rium profits in a one-stage Bertrand competition. Chapter 2 contributes to the literature
on behavioural contract theory since it examines the impact of naiveté on the optimal con-
tracts and profit when the agent can either be time-consistent, sophisticated or naïve and
privately know his degree of inconsistency or believes to know it in case of the naïve type.
Chapter 3 contributes to the empirical literature on behavioural economics and shows that
self-disconnection can partially be explained by low self-control. This chapter suggests
novel policy instruments that can help reduce the negative impact of self-disconnection.
Overall, these chapters are motivated by issues in the energy markets and therefore, this
dissertation contributes to the study of energy economics.
1
Chapter 1
Contracting in a market with
differential information1
1.1 Introduction
The recent advanced infrastructures in the energy sector based on smart meters are now
capable of real lifetime pricing and remote reading. This has generated a debate in re-
lation to the potential sensitivity of data on customers’ patterns that firms will be able
to hold once smart meters are fully implemented. Indeed, the major players in the en-
ergy markets, such as network providers, suppliers, regulators and customers, recognise
the potential sensitivity of data on customers’ energy usage. The Council of European
Energy Regulators has already made recommendations over potential discriminatory be-
haviour and potential measures of data security (CEER 2015).2 Nevertheless, it is still not
clear what is the impact of this new degree of information on competition in the energy
markets.
1This is joint work with Thomas Greve.
2This potential discriminatory behaviour can come from a vertical connection between the distribution
operator (upstream firm) and a retailer firm (downstream firm). This connection can particularly exist if
the downstream firm was previously a de-integrated part of the upstream firm. Then, if the upstream firm
has access to all customers’ information in the market, there might be incentives for the upstream firm to
give access to better data to its affiliated than to the remaining downstream firms in the market.
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The key question posed in this paper is whether a firm with better information about
the customers in the market than their rivals can use that information to earn more profit.
Although, it might seem intuitive, one cannot claim under generality that access to better
information leads to higher profits.
To study the role of information, we introduce a framework of two firms supplying a
good composed by many commodities that compete in prices, which have access to the
same technology and where customers have fixed demand. We are interested in the equi-
librium outcomes under no differential information and under differential information.
To answer our research question, we compare the equilibrium profits of both firms in two
ways. First, we define information advantage as the difference between the equilibrium
profits of the better informed firm and the uninformed firm in the differential informa-
tion case. Second, we define information value as the difference between the equilibrium
profits of the better informed firm under differential information and under no differential
information.
We show that, under no differential information, both firms equally share the cus-
tomers and types of customers, charge the same payments and obtain zero profits. Under
differential information, we assume that access to better information allows the better
informed firm to attract specific customers. Access to better information gives the better
informed firm a first customer contact advantage. The uninformed firm can only offer
a menu of price vectors without being able to pre-identify the customers’ type. Conse-
quently, access to better information leads to a change in the tie-breaking rule. The same
result would hold if, for another reason other than better information, one firm would
have first customer contact advantage. Nonetheless, the uninformed firm can access the
market, not allowing the better informed firm to make positive profits. We find that better
information does not give a firm an advantage or disadvantage, that is, the better informed
firm obtains the same equilibrium profit as the uninformed one. We also show that there
Chapter 1. Contracting in a market with differential information 3
is no information value because the better informed firm has the same equilibrium profit
under both cases.
We also analyse whether our results are robust to changes in the number of customers,
number of firms and number of types. We show that as long as it is possible to equally
divide the number of customers between firms, the symmetric Nash equilibria in pure
strategies exist. Under differential information, the exclusionary Nash equilibria exist
despite of the number of customers of each type. However, once we increase the number
of better informed firms, the exclusionary equilibria exist as long as it is possible to
equally divide the number of customers between the better informed firms.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper relates to two strands of literature. Firstly, it contributes to the literature on
the role of information in oligopolistic markets by analysing the impact of differential
information about the types of customers on equilibrium profits in a one-stage Bertrand
competition. Though the literature on the role of information in oligopolistic markets
under uncertain demand and incomplete information is quite broad (see for example Gal-
Or (1987, 1988), Raith (1996), and Vives (1984)), there is a small literature on whether
access to better information has a positive impact on the equilibrium profit. Further, there
is not a general consensus on the result that it entails. This literature is especially small
when competition is via prices. Vives (1990), using a two-stage model, shows that better
informed firms have an incentive to invest more in the first stage which ends up fostering
its competitive position and profitability. In Vives’s framework, better information al-
ways increases expected profit of the better informed firm and it leads to an information
advantage. Nevertheless, better information may enhance or diminish the rival’s com-
petitive position and profitability depending whether firms compete à la Bertrand or à la
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Cournot. The consequences of differential information arise because the better informed
firm can decide to invest more or less in the first stage.
A more related study to the present paper is Einy et al. (2002). It is shown that a better
informed firm is rewarded, under Cournot competition, when firms’ technology exhibits
constant returns to scale. Chokler et al. (2006) challenge Einy et al. (2002) results and
prove that in Cournot duopolies with differentiated products and linear demand and cost
functions, the better informed firm earns less profit if both firms have symmetric demand
functions. Consequently, one cannot claim, under generality, that better information leads
to higher equilibrium profit for the better informed firm. Indeed, we show that in a one-
stage Bertrand competition, differential information can lead to no information advantage
or disadvantage.
Secondly, our paper contributes to the price discrimination literature and in particular,
on competitive price discrimination and on personalised pricing, whereby firms charge
different prices to different customers based on their willingness to pay. The literature on
personalised pricing has been increasing due to the increasing ability of firms to collect
customers’ data and the ability to offer dynamic pricing. Some papers such as Choudhary
et al. (2005) and Ghose and Huang (2009) have studied the competitive implications of
personalised pricing in a model with product differentiation. Choudhary et al. (2005)
show, in a model with vertical differentiation, that firms can be worse off when they offer
personalised pricing. Ghose and Huang (2009) show, in a model of spatial differentiation,
that firms are better off when they offer personalised pricing and quality compared to
the case when they do not adopt customised pricing. This is because firms can offer
higher qualities to each customer at higher rent extraction ability for each firm. Ghose
and Huang (2009) assume that when a firm adopts personalised pricing and quality it
can perfectly target customers in both price and quality. In our paper, we also assume
that a firm that is better informed can perfectly target customers. We contribute to this
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literature by studying personalised pricing in a model with homogeneous goods and with
differential information. In particular, we show that although, it is possible for the better
informed firm to target customers, that does not allow it to charge higher prices.
The literature on privacy is closely related to the literature on competitive price dis-
crimination and on personalised pricing. The literature on economics of privacy has
analysed, for example, how firms use past behaviour of consumers to infer their taste
and price (see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Esteves, 2010); and how privacy ac-
tions are undertaken by consumers and how consumer information is sold to firms (see
e.g. Casadeus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane 2015, Montes et al. 2016 and Taylor and
Wagman 2014). This literature has been expanding significantly due to the rise of new
technologies and online markets that are able to store consumers’ personal information.3
This also relates to the motivation of our paper in the sense that smart meters will allow
for monitoring and recording of electricity consumption on a near real-time basis. Tech-
nology will also allow identifying the activities of consumers by matching data on their
electricity usage with known appliance load signatures.4
1.3 The Model
Consider an industry where two firms compete in the production of m > 1 different
commodities. There is a given finite set A ⇢ Rm+ of types of customers, where a type is a
vector a 2 A specifying the demand for each of the m commodities. Assume that each
commodity is homogeneous.
3For an overview of the literature on economics of privacy see Acquisti et al. (2016).
4See, for example, Figures 5-1 and 5-2 in NIST (2014) that show how nonintrusive appliance load
monitoring techniques can be used to obtain information about individual consumption patterns.
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Suppose that there are only two types of customers, A = {au, ap}, where au is the
uniform type and ap is the peak type. There are four customers with two uniform cus-
tomers, nu = 2, and two peak customers, np = 2. Let Uu = uu   tu and Up = up   tp
denote the utilities of uniform and peak types, respectively, and where tu and tp are the
payments to the firm. We identify type au customers by the requirement that they con-
sume all commodities of the good by the same amount (i.e. a1u = a2u = ... = amu),
whereas the type ap customers do not consume the same amount of each commodity.5
Firms, indexed by l = 1, 2, have access to the same technology, given by a cost
function C : Rm+ ! R+, where C(y) is the cost of producing the output vector y =
(y1, . . . , ym) 2 Rm+ . It is assumed throughout that
Assumption 1.1. C is continuous and strictly quasi-convex, i.e. for each c 2 R+, the
lower contour set L(c) = {y 2 Rm+ | C(y)  c} is strictly convex.
Assumption 1.2. C exhibits constant returns to scale, that is C( y) =  C(y) for all
y 2 Rm+ and     0.
The assumption of quasi-convexity implies that if y0 or y00, with y0 6= y00, can be





00 will be less costly. For
example, assume that y0 = (50, 0, 0) and y00 = (0, 50, 0) can be produced at the same






= (25, 25, 0) is less costly than producing y0 and y00.
In the context of energy supply, where the different commodities may be interpreted as
consumption in different time intervals, it means that producing a constant flow over time
is cheaper than changing it according to the time of the day.
5Take the following example. Let a1 = (0, 6, 0) means that a customer of type a1 consumes 6 units of
commodity 2 and 0 units of commodities 1 and 3. Similar for a2 = (2, 2, 2). The first type of customer
represents the peak type and the second type of customer represents the uniform type. Our framework
with a good that consists of different commodities allows us as well to have an example where we have
24 commodities. Electricity can be seen as a good that is composed of 24 commodities and so, each
commodity in this case would represent the hourly electricity demand.
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The assumption of constant returns to scale may seem less convincing, but its role
is mainly to avoid too simplistic arguments for competition in cases where one firm in
the market has a larger production than the others; under decreasing returns to scale this
would by itself constitute an efficiency loss to society, and we exclude this case by our
assumptions. Nevertheless, our motivation derives from the retail energy market where
it is not conclusive from the literature that retailers’ technology necessarily exhibits de-
creasing or increasing returns to scale as opposed to constant returns to scale.
The definition below states that an efficient allocation of production across suppliers
is one that minimises production costs. That is, (y1, y2) being efficient means that a total
output of y = y1 + y2 cannot be produced at a lower cost.





) over all (y0, y00) 2 Rm+ ⇥ Rm+ with y0 + y00 = y1 + y2.
Since C is strictly quasi-convex (meaning that the sets L(c) are strictly convex, so that
a convex combination of two distinct points of L(c) belongs to its interior), it is simple
to see which allocations are cost minimising. That is, y1 =  y and y2 = (1    )y for
  2 [0, 1] and some y 2 Rm+ . This means that, for a given y, the cost is minimised when
firms produce the same combination of commodities.
Let x, y be two vectors that are not multiples of each other. In particular, this implies
C (x) , C (y) > 0. Let   = C(x)/C (y), i.e. C (x) = C ( y) by constant returns. Then,
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from C (x) = C ( y), x 6=  y, and strict quasi-convexity (note that we must make use of





















, using constant returns once again:
= C (x) + C (y) .
Hence,
C(x+ y) < C(x) + C(y). (1.1)
For example, if x = au and y = ap, then C(au + ap) < C(au) + C(ap). That is, the
cost of supplying both types of customers is lower than separately supplying both types.
Another case used in the paper is x = 2au + ap and y = au + 2ap, then C(3au + 3ap) <
C(2au + ap) + C(au + 2ap).6
Let p = (p1, p2) be two price vectors in Rm+ .7 Assume that prices are non-negative.8
Recall that we are working in a context of fixed demand with a finite set of types of
customers and firms compete to satisfy this fixed demand. Firms set simultaneously their
prices, customers observe and buy from the firm that offers the lowest payment. That is,
customers can only buy from one single firm.
6A similar result in Cambini and Martein (2009) shows that homogeneity of degree one combined with
quasi-convexity produces convexity (Theorem 2.2.2).
7Each price is a vector, i.e. we have a price for each commodity, pl = (pl1, . . . , plm), for l = 1, 2. In the
context of electricity, this means that we allow for “dynamic pricing” (i.e. time variant electricity prices).
The application of more dynamic forms of prices has been limited in the domestic and small business
sectors, however advanced metering solutions have made this possible (Haney et al. 2011).
8The reasonability on this assumption is based on the lack of evidence of negative electricity retail
prices. Nevertheless, if this assumption were to be dropped, it would become easier not to violate the
incentive compatibility constraints of customers’ types.
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1.3.1 No Differential Information
So far, we have only delineated the general features of our model, not going into informa-
tional problems. Consider first the case where no firm has access to better information.











u · au + nlpplp · ap   C(nluau + nlpap),
where nlu and nlp are, respectively, the number of uniform and peak types customers that
firm l supplies. Customers buy the good if their utility of buying the good is non-negative.
That is, for reasonable prices, customers buy the good and choose to buy from the firm
that offers the lowest payment. Firms face the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints
that require customers not to accept a different price vector other than the one that corre-
sponds to their type.
uu   pu · au   uu   pp · au, (1.2)
up   pp · ap   up   pu · ap. (1.3)
These constraints can be re-written as
(pp   pu) · ap  0  (pp   pu) · au. (1.4)
Equation 1.4 has a geometrical interpretation in the sense that it indicates the space
for non-binding IC constraints.
The IC constraints play an important role in finding potential equilibrium outcomes.
Firms need to construct a menu of price vectors that ensures that the IC constraints are
satisfied for the same total payment. Since demand vectors of both types are different and
fixed, IC constraints can be satisfied by changing pu in the following way: increasing the
Chapter 1. Contracting in a market with differential information 10
price of the commodities that the peak type customer consumes more and decreasing the
price of the commodities that the peak type customer consumes less. This is illustrated
in the example below.
Example 1.1. Let au = (3, 3, 3) be the demand of the uniform customer and ap =
(7, 1, 1) be the demand of the peak customer with the following price vectors for each
type, pu = (1, 1, 1) and pp = (2, 1, 1). The uniform customer pays a total payment equal
to 9, whereas the peak customer pays a total payment equal to 16 if it accepts the peak
payment and it pays a total payment equal to 9 if it accepts the uniform type payment.
Thus, the IC constraint for the peak type is no longer satisfied. However, we can find a
price that satisfies this condition. Take the price vector p̂u = (2.2, 0.4, 0.4). This gener-
ates the same total payment for the uniform type. The peak type would need to pay a total
payment equal to 16.2 in case it would accept the uniform type payment. Thus, it prefers
to accept the peak type payment.9
Both firms simultaneously set their prices, customers observe all posted prices and
buy from the firm with the lowest payment. The lowest payments are
pu · au = min{p1u · au, p2u · au},
pp · ap = min{p1p · ap, p2p · ap}.
If both firms post pu · au and pp · ap, then they equally split the customers (i.e. nlu = 1
and nlp = 1, for l = 1, 2) such that the IC constraints hold. We want to investigate Nash
equilibria in which both firms are active in the market, set the same payments and supply
the same composition of types. The set of such symmetric equilibria is characterised by
9This can also be achieved by allowing for negative prices in some commodities or by changing both
price vectors. Further, the general case with m commodities makes the problem less restricted. That is, if
the IC constraints are satisfied with three commodities, these will be satisfied as well with m commodities
because there are more degrees of freedom for the firm to find different combinations of prices.
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two conditions. First, both firms have in equilibrium ⇡l   0. Second, unilateral price
under-cutting should not be profitable. The next proposition shows existence of Nash
equilibria with symmetric payments. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1.1. There are two classes of Nash equilibria with symmetric payments in
pure strategies with ⇡l = 0, l = 1, 2, and with the following payments:
(i) pu · au = C(2au + ap)  C(au + ap) and pp · ap = 2C(au + ap)  C(2au + ap),
(ii) pu · au = 2C(au + ap)  C(au + 2ap) and pp · ap = C(au + 2ap)  C(au + ap).
Proposition 1.1 shows that both firms can equally share the customers in terms of
types while offering the same payment to each type. There is a continuum of Nash
equilibria because for the same total payment there can be different prices for each com-
modity. Thus, there is symmetry in terms of payments, but there can be asymmetry in
terms of prices. Proposition 1.2 considers the existence of equilibria with symmetric
payments when firms make zero profits. It is important to consider a) the existence of an
equilibrium with symmetric payments where at least one firm makes positive profit; and
b) the existence of an equilibrium with asymmetric payments.
Proposition 1.2. There is no Nash equilibrium with asymmetric payments or where at
least one firm makes positive profit.
Proposition 1.2 shows that there is no Nash equilibrium with asymmetric payments.
Further, it will not be an equilibrium if one firm gains positive profit and the other makes
zero profit. This is because if firms obtain different profits, then the firm with lower profit
has an incentive to mimic the other firm’s payments.
1.3.2 Differential Information
Assume that firms have different access to information about customers. Let firm 1 be
better informed in the sense that it can see the types of all customers served by any firm in
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the industry, whereas firm 2 does not have access to this information. In connection with
this difference in information, we assume that firm 1 can use the information on types to
offer personalised payments, wa 2 R, to customers of type a 2 A, whereas firm 2 can
only offer a menu of price vectors, (pu, pp) ⇢ Rm ⇥ Rm. We assume the tie-breaking
rule that customers buy from firm 1 in case of indifference.10
Given firm 2’s payments, firm 1 can attract customers of type a, subject to a payment
wa, such that
wa  p2a · aa,with a = u, p. (1.5)
If the payment offered by firm 1 is higher, then customers will not accept it. Firm
2 takes wa as given and supplies the remaining customers as long as its profit is non-









u · au + n2pp2p · ap   C(n2uau + n2pap). (1.6)
Since firm 2 does not have access to the same information about customers as firm 1,
firm 2’s problem is subject to the IC constraints as in the no differential information case.
We can observe three potential equilibrium outcomes: (1) firm 1 sells only to uniform
customers and firm 2 sells to peak customers, (2) firm 1 sells only to peak customers and
firm 2 sells to uniform customers, and (3) firm 1 sells to both types of customers. We
show that there is no equilibrium where the allocation of customers is as in (1) or (2), but
there is an exclusionary equilibrium where the better informed firm sells to both types of
customers. Further, the case where both firms equally split the customers cannot be an
equilibrium due to the tie-breaking rule. The proposition below states this result.
10This tie-breaking rule makes sense in our framework because firm 1, the better informed firm, can
approach each customer knowing beforehand its type, whereas firm 2 needs to wait for each customer to
approach the firm.
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Proposition 1.3. (Exclusionary equilibria) First, there is no equilibrium where firms
supply equally the customers or where each firm supplies a type of customer. Second,
there is a continuum of equilibria, where the better informed firm sells to both types such
that:
(i) wu + wp = C(au + ap),
(ii) wu  C(2au + ap)  C(au + ap) and wp  C(au + 2ap)  C(au + ap),
(iii) wu = p2u · au and wp = p2p · ap,
with allocation n1u = 2 and n1p = 2, thereby achieving profits ⇡1 = 0.
Proposition 1.3 implies that holding better information about the customers in the
market and the ability to contact customers before firm 2, does not translate into higher
profit for firm 1. This is because positive profit would give firm 2 an incentive to undercut
firm 1’s payments.
1.3.3 Market Structure and Social Surplus
There is one possible market structure with differential information and one possible case
without differential information. In each case, firms earn zero profits, with the difference
that firm 2 is excluded from the market in the differential information case. This arises
from our assumption of homogeneous commodities.
Proposition 1.2 shows that, under no differential information, there is no Nash equi-
librium with asymmetric payments. This holds even when one firm in the market supplies
both types of customers. This result is reversed once we introduce differential informa-
tion. In fact, Proposition 1.3 shows that there is a continuum of Nash equilibria when the
better informed firm supplies both types of customers. The tie-breaking rule plays a key
role in this difference. Access to information about the types of customers in the market
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allows firm 1 a first customer contact advantage. Firm 2 can only offer a menu of price
vectors without being able to pre-identify the customer’s type.
We have defined information advantage as the difference between the equilibrium
profits of the better informed firm and the uninformed firm in the differential information
case. In this case, firm 2 is excluded while firm 1 supplies all customers. There is no
information advantage because firm 1 is excluded from the market.
We have defined information value as the difference between the equilibrium profits
of the better informed firm in the differential information case and in the no differential
information. There is no information value because the better informed firm has the same
equilibrium profit in both cases.
These results contrast to the literature that says that there is an information advantage
or disadvantage depending on the firms’ information setup (Chokler et al. 2006). This
result is explained by two main reasons. First, the presence of competition because the
residual customer can switch to the other firm, it is not possible for the better informed
firm to extract surplus from the customers through its access to information about the
customers. Second, firm 2 is allowed to offer a menu of two price vectors (i.e. one for
each type). The price vectors allow firm 2 to avoid giving an information rent that induces
the customers to reveal their private information regarding their types. If, instead of
offering a menu of price vectors, firm 2 could only offer one price vector to all customers,
then firm 1 would be able to charge higher prices and enjoy an information advantage.
This conclusion holds in the short-run where the uninformed firm imposes a compet-
itive constraint to the better informed firm and therefore, the better informed firm gains
zero profit despite of holding better information about all customers in the market. In
the medium-run, the uninformed firm will not enter the market, or leave quickly, which
leads to the possibility of the informed firm to be able to charge higher prices and enjoy
an information advantage.
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In each of the market structures mentioned above, social surplus equals the utility of
customers less the operating cost. The social surplus is the same in all cases because there
is no difference in terms of costs and the fixed demand is fully covered. The customer
surplus will also be the same in both market structures. However, the surplus of each type
may differ; in fact, each type may be better, worse or remain the same when we compare
both market structures. The reason for this is that there are two classes of Nash equilibria
for each market structure. For example, if under no differential information the set of
equilibrium payments is pu · au = C(2au + ap)   C(au + ap) and pp · ap = 2C(au +
ap)   C(2au + ap), whereas in the differential information case the set of equilibrium
payments is pu ·au = 2C(au+ap) C(au+2ap) and pp ·ap = C(au+2ap) C(au+ap).
Then, the uniform type will be better off and the peak type will be worse off when firm 1
is better informed. Nevertheless, the customer surplus will remain the same.
Based on definition 1, the allocation of production is efficient in both market struc-
tures. This is because a combination of different types is supplied by a given firm.
1.4 Robustness Analysis
To this point, we have assumed that there are two firms and two types of customers.
We are now interested in examining the robustness of the results to small changes in the
number of customers, firms and types.
1.4.1 Number of customers
So far, we have assumed that there are a total of four customers, two of each type. Sup-
pose now that there are nu uniform customers and np peak customers, with nu, np 2 Z+
and finite numbers. Suppose that no firm has access to better information.
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If for at least one type na2 /2 Z
+, a 2 A, then it is no longer possible to split each type
of customers equally between firms. Consequently, production is not efficient. By (1),
combining all customers in one single firm leads to cost savings and so, higher profit. The
same applies for a situation with asymmetric payments. Hence, the result of Proposition
1.1 will not hold if it is not possible to equally share each type of customers between both
firms.
Furthermore, under differential information the same result holds. That is, the better
informed firm has incentives to supply both types of customers, independently of the
number of customers of each type. Thus, the result of no information advantage and no
information disadvantage holds if it is possible to equally split the customers between
firms.
1.4.2 Number of firms
We are now interested in analysing the impact on the market outcomes once we add one
more firm. Assume that there are three firms and consider three customers of each type
instead of two in order to avoid the unequal split. As shown above, if it is not possible to
equally split the customers between firms, then Nash equilibria with symmetric payments
in pure strategies under no differential information no longer exist.
If we add one more uninformed firm, then this firm will behave as firm 2 above
because it is not a profitable deviation to decrease (or increase) the payment for the peak
type or uniform type. The payments will remain the same and the same Nash equilibria
with symmetric payments exist.
Assume now that firm 1 and firm 3 are equally informed, whereas firm 2 remains
uninformed. Since firms 1 and 3 cannot equally split the customers of each type, then the
exclusionary outcome under differential information will no longer hold. As before, the
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result of no information advantage and no information disadvantage holds if it is possible
to equally split the customers between firms.
1.4.3 Number of types
The number of types increases the complexity in setting a menu of price vectors. Con-
sider three types, au, ar, and ap. In order to avoid the unequal split, assume that there
are two customers of each type. Now, we have the following additional IC constraints to
those already mentioned before: pu · au  pr · au, pp · ap  pr · ap, pr · ar  pu · ar and
pr · ar  pp · ar. Example 1.2 shows that if there are not enough degrees of freedom to
find different combinations of prices (i.e. three types and three commodities), then it is
not possible to adjust the payments such that the IC constraints are satisfied.
Example 1.2. Consider the following consumption profiles of three different types of
customers: au = (3, 3, 3), ar = (3, 3.5, 2.5) and ap = (7, 1, 1). Consider the following
price vectors for each type, pu = (1, 1, 1), pr = (1, 1.5, 1) and pp = (2, 1, 1). In this
case, both types ar and ap would prefer to accept the payment offered to the uniform type
because they would pay less. Even by considering changes in all price vectors, in order
to maintain the same total payment, no solution exists with non-negative prices. Thus,
the IC constraints would not be satisfied.
If the IC constraints are not satisfied, the result stated in Proposition 1.1 would no
longer hold as one firm can offer a higher price and enjoy profits. However, this prob-
lem can be solved by adding enough commodities. The example below shows that the
IC constraints are satisfied once we add two more commodities. Note that, as before,
we imposed a non-negativity constraint in the price vectors. Without such constraint,
the problem in Example 1.2 would be possible to solve without the violation of the IC
constraints.
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Example 1.3. Consider the following consumption profiles of three different types of cus-
tomers: au = (2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5), ar = (3, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2) and ap = (7, 1, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5).
Consider the following price vectors for each type, pu = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1), pr = (1.5, 1, 1, 1, 1)
and pp = (1.5, 1, 1, 1, 1). As before, types ar and ap would prefer to accept the payment
offered to the uniform type because they would pay less. If we change the price vectors
as follows: pu = (3, 2, 0, 0, 0), pr = (1.8, 3.4, 0, 0, 0) and pp = (1.8, 3.4, 0, 0, 0), then the
same total payments remain the same and the IC constraints are satisfied.
In order to find different combinations of prices that ensure the IC constraints to
hold, we need to have a large number of commodities that is greater than the number of
types. Under that case, the result of no information advantage or disadvantage is robust
to changes in the number of types.
1.5 Conclusion
We have analysed whether there is an information advantage or disadvantage in a market
where firms compete in prices with a good composed by homogeneous commodities. We
have assumed that if one of the firms knows the corresponding type of all customers in
the market, then this firm can offer personalised payments. Even though it is possible for
the better informed firm to select its own customers as opposed to the uninformed firm,
it obtains the same equilibrium profit as the uninformed firm and as in the case with no
differential information.
While the literature does not generally conclude that better information entails higher
profits, from our knowledge it only shows cases where there is information advantage or
disadvantage. Indeed, this paper presents a game where the equilibrium profits for both
firms (better informed and uninformed) remains the same.
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Furthermore, we show that it is not the additional ability to price discriminate that
leads the better informed firm being able to exclude the uninformed firm from the market;
but rather the first customer contact advantage. The uninformed firm can only offer a
menu of price vectors without being able to pre-identify the customer’s type.
We have assumed in our model that there are two types of customers with fixed de-
mand. This may not be satisfactory if we would like to model a market such like elec-
tricity, where demand for electricity in the industrial segment is elastic (as opposed to
the current residential segment). An extension of the model would be to have the subset
of types that, for example, represents the residential segment with inelastic demand and
another subset of types representing the industrial one with elastic demand.
Furthermore, electricity can be sold as a differentiated good if, for example, we con-
sider reliability, which may be crucial in case there is a positive probability of power
blackouts. In this case, each contract offered to a given customer would specify the price
and the customer’s service order or priority. Thus, another extension of the paper would
be to allow for differentiation and to analyse the robustness of the results.
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1.7 Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.1:
Let prices be as in (i) stated in Proposition 1.1, then ⇡l = 0, l = 1, 2, with corre-
sponding allocation of customers nlu = 1 and nlp = 1. Further, we can assume that prices
are in the interior of the feasible set given by the IC constraints and that small unilat-
eral changes on prices do not violate these constraints. This means that the following
conditions need to hold:
pu · au  pp · au,
pp · ap  pu · ap,
and pu · au + pp · ap = C(au + ap).
Given that au and ap are not multiples of each other, firms can adjust the payments such
that the IC constraints are satisfied. That is, pu can be adjusted such that pu · au changes
but pu · ap remains constant. Thus, we can move any price vector from the boundary into
the interior of the feasible set. Hence, payments set in (i) can be implemented while IC
constraints are satisfied. The same applies for the payments set in (ii) stated in Proposi-
tion 1.1.
Even with IC constraints being satisfied, there are several ways in which a firm could
deviate.
(a) If one firm increases the price of the uniform type, then it loses the uniform cus-
tomer and obtains
⇡̂ = pp · ap   C(ap)
= 2C(au + ap)  C(2au + ap)  C(ap) < 0,
where the inequality in the second line comes from (1.1). Thus, increasing the price
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of the uniform type is not a profitable deviation. Similarly, if one firm increases the
price of the uniform customer and decreases the price of the peak type customer, then
it loses the uniform type and attracts one more peak type at p̂p · ap < pp · ap. Then,
⇡̂ = 2(p̂p · ap)   C(2ap) = 2(p̂p · ap   C(ap)), where the second equality comes from
constant returns to scale. However, ⇡̂ = 2(p̂p ·ap C(ap)) < 0 because p̂p ·ap < pp ·ap =
2C(au + ap)  C(2au + ap) < C(ap).
(b) By the same reasoning, if firm one decreases the price of the uniform customer
and increases the payment of the peak type customer, then it loses the peak type customer
and attracts one more uniform type customer at p̂u · au < pu · au. By (1.1), pu · au =
C(2au+ ap) C(au+ ap) < C(au), then ⇡̂ < ⇡ = 0. By the same reasoning, increasing
the price of the peak type is not a unilateral profitable deviation.
(c) If one firm slightly decreases the price of the uniform type (i.e. p̂u · au < pu · au),
then it supplies both uniform customers and one peak customer and it obtains ⇡̂ = 2(p̂u ·
au)+pp ·ap C(2au+ap) < 2pu ·au+pp ·ap C(2au+ap) = 0. Therefore, decreasing
the price of one of the commodities of the uniform type is not a profitable deviation.
(d) If one firm slightly decreases the price of the peak type (i.e. p̂p · ap < pp · ap), it
supplies one uniform type and two peak type, obtaining ⇡̂ = pu ·au+2(p̂p ·ap) C(au+
2ap) < pu ·au+2pp ·ap C(au+2ap) = 3C(au+ap) C(2au+ap) C(au+2ap) < 0,
by (1.1). Hence, decreasing the price of the peak type is not a profitable deviation.
(e) If one firm increases the price of both peak and uniform types, then loses all
customers and therefore, it is not a profitable deviation.
(f) If one firm decreases the price of both peak and uniform types, such that p̂p · ap <
pp · ap and p̂u · au < pu · au, then revenue falls below total cost of supplying peak and
uniform type customers, i.e. ⇡̂ < ⇡ = 0.
We conclude that it is not profitable for a firm to unilaterally deviate. Similarly, it is
not profitable for a firm to unilaterally deviate if pu · au = 2C(au + ap)   C(au + 2ap)
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and pp · ap = C(au + 2ap)  C(au + ap).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.2:
As shown in the proof of proposition 1.1, we can assume that unilateral small changes
in prices do not violate IC constraints. There are different cases that need to be analysed.
Case 1. Assume that ⇡1 = 0 and ⇡2 > 0. Then, firm 1 has an incentive to mimic firm
2’s payments and increase profit. The same reasoning applies to the reverse case.
Case 2. Let payments be symmetric such that ⇡l > 0, l = 1, 2. As shown in case
1, profits of both firms need to be equal. It is a profitable deviation to slightly decrease
both payments, p̂u · au < pu · au and p̂p · ap < pp · ap, such that IC constraints still
hold. Then, the firm that deviates gains ⇡̂ = 2p̂u · au + 2p̂p · ap   C(2au + 2ap) =
2(p̂u · au + p̂p · ap   C(au + ap)) (by constant returns to scale). Given that demand is
fixed and unilateral changes are very small, we can say w.l.o.g. that pu · au t p̂u · au and
pp · ap t p̂p · ap. Then, ⇡̂ t 2(pu · au + pp · ap   C(au + ap)) = 2⇡ > ⇡ > 0.
Case 3. Let payments be asymmetric such that ⇡l = 0, l = 1, 2. Again, we can
assume that unilateral small changes in prices do not violate IC constraints. There are
several cases that need to be analysed. In all these cases, one firm will offer a lower
payment than the other firm for at least one type. Then, that firm has an incentive to
slightly increase the payment without matching the other firm’s offer and hence, without
losing customers.
Case 4. Let payments be asymmetric such that ⇡l > 0, l = 1, 2.
(i) Suppose that p1u ·au = p2u ·au and p1p ·ap < p2p ·ap (the same applies if p1u ·au = p2u ·au
and p2p · ap < p1p · ap). Then, ⇡1 = ⇡2 because otherwise any firm could deviate to the
same allocation of types and charge the same payment as the other firm and increase
profit. We can then use ⇡1 = ⇡2 to obtain p1p · ap = 12C(au + 2ap)  
1
2C(au). If firm 2
decreases the price of the peak type such that it attracts one peak type customer, it obtains
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⇡̂
2
= pu · au + pp · ap   C(au + ap). By 12C(au) > C(au + ap)   C(
1
2au + ap) (that
follows from (1)), we know that ⇡̂2 > ⇡2. Thus, decreasing the price of the peak type is
a unilateral profitable deviation.
(ii) By same reasoning, there is a profitable deviation if p1u · au < p2u · au and p1p · ap =
p
2
p · ap while ⇡l > 0 (the same applies if p2u · au < p1u · au and p1p · ap = p2p · ap).
(iii) Suppose that p1u · au < p2u · au and p1p · ap > p2p · ap. If firm 1 matches the same
peak payment as firm 1, it obtains ⇡̂1 = 2pu ·au+ pp ·ap C(2au+ap) > ⇡1+ 12⇡
2
= 0.
(iv) Suppose that p1u · au < p2u · au and p1p · ap < p2p · ap. Then, firm 2 is not supplying
any customers and therefore, firm 2 can match exactly the same as firm 1 and supply
equally uniform and peak type customers as firm 1.
We conclude that there is no equilibrium with asymmetric payments and ⇡l > 0.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.3:
In order to analyse the potential outcomes of introducing differential information, we
need to consider an equilibrium where firm 1 sells to both uniform customers and firm
2 sells to peak customers (case 1), or firm 1 sells to peak customers and firm 2 sells to
uniform customers (case 2), and an exclusionary equilibrium where firm 1 sells to all
customers (case 3). The case where both firms supply equally the customers is ruled out
because of the tie-breaking rule.
Case 1. Consider the requirements for a situation in which firm 1 sells to type au
customers and firm 2 sells to type ap customers. Both customers and firms must be
satisfied with this split. For customers, this requires that type au prefers to buy from firm
1,
wu  p2u · au, (1.7)
and that type ap prefers firm 2,
wp > p
2
p · ap. (1.8)
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Then, firm 2 has an incentive to slightly increase p2p · ap and increase profit. Therefore,
this cannot be an equilibrium.
Case 2. By the same token, there is no equilibrium if firm 1 sells only to ap customers
and firm 2 sells only to au customers.
Case 3. Now, we consider the requirements for a situation in which firm 1 sells to
both types au and ap customers. That is, firm 1 excludes firm 2 serving both customer
types at payments that do not allow firm 2 to cover the cost of attracting any type of
customers. For this to be an equilibrium, it is necessary that firm 1’s profit is non-negative
and the payments of both firms are identical. The latter condition is needed because
otherwise firm 1 could increase the payments up to firm 2’s offers without losing the
customers and gain profit under the assumption that IC constraints hold. Furthermore,
firm 1’s profit must be zero, otherwise firm 2 could undercut and increase profit, i.e.
wu + wp = C(au + ap).
For firm 1, this requires that supplying both types of customers at wu and wp is more
profitable than selling only to type au. Further, firm 1 must prefer supplying all customers
rather than competing only for the peak type customers or leaving one peak customer to
firm 2 or to compete for both peak type customers and leaving one uniform type for firm
2.
2wu + 2wp   C(2au + 2ap)   2wu   C(2au), (1.9)
2wu + 2wp   C(2au + 2ap)   2wp   C(2ap), (1.10)
2wu + 2wp   C(2au + 2ap)   2wu + wp   C(2au + ap), (1.11)
2wu + 2wp   C(2au + 2ap)   wu + 2wp   C(au + 2ap). (1.12)
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Simplifying equations (1.9) -(1.10) and using wu + wp = C(au + ap), we obtain the
following conditions:
wa  C(aa), for a = u, p, (1.13)
wu  C(2au + ap)  C(au + ap), (1.14)
wp  C(au + 2ap)  C(au + ap). (1.15)
Further, (1.14) and (1.15) are stricter than (1.13) by strict quasi-convexity.
We suffice to show that wu + wp = C(au + ap), (1.14) and (1.15) is non-empty. By
summing equations (1.14) and (1.15), we obtain C(3au+3ap)  C(2au+ ap)+C(au+
2ap). By (1.1) we know that the resulting condition is strictly satisfied.
There will be different combinations of (wu, wp) that satisfy these conditions and
therefore, we can have a continuum of equilibria.
28
Chapter 2
Contracting in a market with
self-control
2.1 Introduction
In many domains of life, individuals set goals and make promises, but potentially post-
pone actions and fail to achieve goals. This can have impact on decisions that individuals
face as consumers. For example, consumers may need to produce forecasts of their fu-
ture preferences at the time they decide to enter a contract with a firm. If consumers have
dynamically inconsistent preferences that affect consumption and saving decisions, then
this can have significant effects in the design of optimal contracts.
An example of this environment stems from the energy sector where prepayment me-
ters allow consumers to pay for electricity and/or gas before they consume it. Consumers
must plan in advance their future consumption. This may lead to self-disconnection,
which happens when the credit runs out and energy supply is stopped. This can be par-
ticularly costly for a specific type of consumer that is not aware of his degree of time
inconsistency at the contracting stage. The behavioural economic literature defines this
type of consumer as naïve. This type differs from a sophisticated type in the sense that
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a sophisticated type is fully aware of his inconsistency and so, he correctly predicts how
his future self will behave.1
The key question of this paper is whether a profit-maximising firm would want to
induce the naïve type to consume the good. To answer this question, this paper develops
a model of monopolistic contracting in a two selves framework. The model has an agent
and a principal and two dates/periods. The agent can be time-consistent, sophisticated or
naïve. The principal cannot observe the type of the agent at date 0 (i.e. the contracting
stage). At date 0, the principal offers the agent a menu of contracts or a single contract.
Each contract involves a quantity and a non-negative payment to the principal. We focus
our attention to specific contract forms: a pay-in-advance (hereafter, PIA) contract that
involves a payment at date 0 and a payment at date 1, and a pay-in-advance (hereafter,
PAD) contract that only involves a payment at date 1. In order to make any payment,
the agent needs to make a saving decision and incur a savings effort cost. At date 1,
the agent’s marginal utility of consumption is affected by a shock, good or bad, and
consumption is only efficient in the good state. This together with the need to save
in order to make a payment generates demand for flexibility. In addition, the self-0
sophisticated type values commitment because via a commitment contract, the self-0 is
able to commit the self-1 to the self-0’s desired consumption.
Under unobservability of time inconsistency, an adverse selection problem arises be-
cause the time-consistent type values flexibility more than a sophisticated type. Naiveté
introduces a further complication because the self-0 naïve type behaves as the time-
consistent type and hence, perfect self-selection at the contracting stage is not possible.
1Another example stems from the use of fertiliser in developing countries. The use of fertilisers has
been incentivised (until a certain point) by agricultural experts because fertilisers generate positive agri-
cultural yields. However, evidence shows an under-utilisation of fertiliser in African countries. Duflo et
al. (2010) analyse this puzzle and argue that behavioural biases limit profitable investments in fertiliser
by farmers in developing countries. It is further argued that this happens in a similar way that behavioural
biases limit investment in attractive financial investments in pension plans by workers in the United States.
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We find that by restricting the number of contracts to a single PIA contract that induces
the self-1 sophisticated type to consume the good, the principal also induces the self-1
naïve type to consume in the good state. However, this is achieved at the expense of
flexibility given that the agent needs to incur a savings effort cost even if no consumption
is made (i.e. in the bad state).
We also show that if we do not impose the naïve type’s consumption constraint, the
principal can offer a menu of contracts composed of a PIA and a PAD contracts while
extracting all rents from the remaining types. Once we add the naïve type’s consumption
constraint, the self-0 naïve type behaves as the time-consistent type and so, the princi-
pal needs to decrease the payments sufficiently to induce consumption. Hence, there
is a trade-off between increasing efficiency and decreasing information rent that occurs
partially at date 0 preferences and partially at date 1 preferences. We also study the con-
ditions under which it is profit-maximising for the principal to offer a menu of contracts
and a single PIA contract that induce positive consumption to all types.
Lastly, we study the impact of the naïve type on the remaining types’ utilities and the
principal’s expected profit. We show that the principal may have incentives to educate
the naïve into a sophisticated type because it can generate greater profits. The reason for
this is that the principal needs to decrease the payments sufficiently to induce positive
consumption from the naïve type. Once a naïve type becomes a sophisticated type, the
principal can offer a different contract than the time-consistent type and extract rents.
Therefore, the sophisticated and the time-consistent types are better off with the presence
of the naïve type if the principal offers a menu of contracts.
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2.2 Related literature
Our model follows the literature on the problem of contracting with time-inconsistent
agents or boundedly rational consumers. We focus on the design of optimal contracts
that can induce the naïve type to consume while inducing the time-consistent and the
sophisticated types to consume.
Our paper belongs to the literature on contracting with time inconsistency, which
includes the seminal paper by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) that studies optimal
contracts in a complete information setup and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The authors
show that for time-inconsistent agents, a monopoly under a two-part pricing scheme and
offering an “investment good” will charge a per-usage price below the marginal cost and
a higher lump-sum fee. Two rationales are given for explaining such result: commitment
and consumer overconfidence.2 In the same framework, Li et al. (2014) extend DellaVi-
gna and Malmendier’s model by introducing private information on the consumer’s ben-
efit from the good while assuming that agents are sophisticated. They show that there is
an important threshold value of short-run patience, such that below it time-inconsistent
preferences hurt the firm’s profits. By contrast, in this paper, private information is on the
consumer’s time preferences and the agent can be time-consistent, sophisticated or naïve
type.
Closest to our work, Galperti (2015) shows that the principal can implement the first-
best under complete information, but under unobservable time inconsistency a screening
issue arises. It is shown that an efficient savings device for a time-inconsistent agent
rewards savings and penalises withdrawals. However, if a time-consistent agent takes
such a device, he does so expecting to receive more rewards and fewer penalties than
otherwise. To lower the time-consistent agent’s information rent, the principal curtails
2Indeed, the literature on behavioural industrial organisation with self-control problems can be usefully
grouped with works from the overconfidence literature. For more information, see Grubb (2015).
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the flexibility below efficiency. Galperti (2015) builds from the formulation of Amador
et al. (2006) that also studies the presence of temptation for current consumption with
a taste shock in each period. In Galperti (2015) the agent can only be time-consistent
or -inconsistent, where time-inconsistent corresponds to a full sophisticated type. In
our model, the agent can be time-consistent, sophisticated or naïve. Although, Galperti
(2015) has a small discussion about the introduction of a naïve type, it does not explain
how this would be formulated into the model and how exactly that would affect the re-
sults. Furthermore, Galperti’s motivation stems from the consumption-saving decisions
where the principal can be a profit-maximising firm or a welfare-maximising planner and
hence, the agent can save different amounts each leading to a tax penalty or a subsidy.
The motivation for our model comes from a profit-maximising firm that offers a contract
to a consumer, where payments are usually non-negative. We do not allow for negative
payments, which translate into less flexibility into the model since the principal is not
allowed to give a penalty at date 1 in case the agent does not consume. Further, in the
present paper a payment requires a savings effort cost from the agent.
Within this literature, other papers have focused attention on cases where the naïve
consumer underestimates the cost and consumes too much. For example, Eliaz and
Spiegler (2006) study a principal-agent problem under the assumption that agent’s types
differ in preferences while considering a principal that offers a menu of exploitative and
non-exploitative contracts. The principal has an incentive to induce naïve types to sign
up for the exploitative contracts. These agents will accept under the belief that they will
be the ones to extract rent from the principal. Esteban et al. (2007) study nonlinear pric-
ing schemes for a monopoly when self-control is costly using temptation preferences as
in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). As in Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), the firm acts optimally
taking advantage of the consumers’ temptation, however it is also shown that it is pos-
sible that the presence of temptation does not raise the firm’s maximal profits. Grubb
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(2009) considers contracting with consumers who overestimate the extent to which they
can predict their demand for a product. Heidhues and Kőszegi (2010) study a similar
problem, but specific to the credit market while analysing welfare-increasing interven-
tions. Different from these papers, we study the case where the naïve type’s unawareness
increases the likelihood of under consumption that can harm both the consumer and the
firm.
2.3 Model
Consider a monopolistic firm (the principal, P) who sells a good, q 2 {0, 1}, to a con-
sumer (the agent, A). All parties are risk neutral. The agent can have dynamically in-
consistent preferences, whereas the principal is time-consistent. The type of the agent is
unobservable to the principal. Moreover, the agent can choose to exert a savings effort
cost, which is necessary to be able to consume at all.
Agent. In order to model time inconsistency we follow the two-selves framework,
where the agent has a self-0 who lives during date 0 and chooses the contract (or rejects
it) and self-1 who lives during date 1 and chooses to consume or not. The agent can
be time-consistent or time-inconsistent. The time-inconsistent can be sophisticated or
naïve type. Let ✓ measure the degree of time consistency, where ✓ 2 ⇥ = {✓, 1}, with
✓ 2 (0, 1). Let ˜✓ be an agent’s belief about his true type. Thus, there are three different
types of agent each with a pair (✓, ˜✓), with (✓, ˜✓) 2 {(1, 1), (✓, ✓), (✓, 1)}. The time-
consistent type has ✓ = ˜✓ = 1. The sophisticated type has inconsistent preferences, and
is aware of it, ✓ = ˜✓ = ✓. The naïve type has inconsistent preferences, ✓ = ✓, but is
unaware of it, ˜✓ = 1. The principal does not observe the agent’s type, but believes that
the agent is time-consistent, sophisticated or naïve with respective probabilities ⌫1, ⌫2,
and (1  ⌫1   ⌫2).
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Assume that the agent’s marginal utility of consumption,  s, is affected by a shock,
where s denotes the state of nature, s = g (for good) and s = b (for bad), with 0 <
 b <  g. Let the probability of the good state be p and the probability of the bad state be
(1  p). Shocks are neither observable nor verifiable by the principal. The realised shock
is only observable to the agent’s self-1.
In order to make any payment and to consume the good, q = 1, the agent needs to
make a saving decision and incur savings effort cost  . We assume that  is equal for all
types and that saving can occur either at date 0 or at date 1, S0, S1 2 {0, 1}, S0+S1  1.
Assume that S0 and S1 are not contractible.
Assumption 2.1. (Efficiency) The following holds:  g > c+  >  b,
where c > 0 is the marginal cost of producing good q. This assumption means that,
from a date-0 perspective, it is efficient that the agent chooses to consume in the good
state and not to consume in the bad state. We also assume that the marginal benefit
of consumption in the bad state for the time-consistent type is lower than the marginal
benefit of consumption for the time-inconsistent types in the good state, i.e.  b <  g✓.
We introduce this assumption to avoid those cases where the degree of time inconsistency
is so low that any contract that induces the time-inconsistent types to consume would
automatically induce the time-consistent type to consume in both states.
The shock that affects the marginal utility of consumption is only observed by the
self-1 agent. This together with consumption being efficient only in the good state and
the need to incur savings effort cost generate demand for flexibility. In addition, the self-0
sophisticated type values commitment, because via a commitment contract, the self-0 is
able to commit the self-1 to the self-0’s desired consumption. This introduces a trade-off
between commitment and flexibility from the point of view of the self-0 sophisticated
type. This trade-off is not perceptible for the self-0 naïve type, because he is not aware
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of his lack of self-control; or in other words, the self-0 naïve type values flexibility as
the self-0 time-consistent type does, which is more than the self-0 sophisticated type.
Flexibility plays a key role, because otherwise the principal would offer only contracts
that involve a commitment from the agent.
Contracts. The principal offers a menu of contracts or payment options T = {t(ˆ✓)}✓̂2⇥,
where ˆ✓ is the type reported by the agent when accepting the contract and t(ˆ✓) = {t0(ˆ✓), t1(ˆ✓, q)}
where t0 and t1 are the payments made during date 0 and date 1, respectively, and t1 de-
pends on consumption. The menu of contracts has to induce savings effort if it is to
ensure positive consumption. The principal is assumed to be always committed to fulfil
the rights and obligations in the contract.
Once contracts are offered, the agent evaluates the quantity and payment of any given
contract, with respect to his belief about his own type. The agent’s utility is normalised
to zero if he refuses the contract with the principal. Assume that the agent is budget-
constrained and thus, it will not be possible for the principal to include penalties. This
assumption rules out contracts where the agent would need to pay a penalty at date 1 in
case he would not consume, i.e. we must have t1(ˆ✓, 0) = 0.
Two kinds of contracts are possible: pay-in-advance and pay-after-delivery. The pay-
in-advance contract will take the form of a payment option that permits an early payment
that can only be used to consume the good in the future without allowing for withdrawals.
This is outlined in the definition below.
Definition 2.1. A pay-after-delivery (PAD) contract is a payment schedule that does not
involve any payment at date 0: t0(ˆ✓) = 0. A pay-in-advance (PIA) contract is a payment
schedule that involves a payment at date 0 (upfront payment): t0(ˆ✓) > 0.
In a full PIA contract, the agent needs to pay the full payment at date 0 in order to
consume the good at date 1, but choice q = 0 is always possible. However, the closer to
Chapter 2. Contracting in a market with self-control 36
a full PIA contract, the greater will be the cost associated with the loss of flexibility.
From the literature on behavioural economics, sophisticated agents search for com-
mitment devices in order to induce themselves to make certain future choices. A com-
mitment device has a cost associated with losing flexibility. A PIA contract can be seen
as a commitment device if the agent is willing to pay something simply to gain the com-
mitment without any other benefit (Bryan et al. 2010).
We are particularly interested in studying two potential outcomes: (1) all types accept
a PIA contract, and (2) the sophisticated type accepts the PIA contract and the time-
consistent and the naïve types accept a PAD contract. Importantly, the case where the
sophisticated and naïve types accept a PIA contract and the time-consistent type accepts
a PAD contract is not achievable, because the self-0 naïve type behaves as the time-
consistent type. Furthermore, we are particularly interested when all types consume the
good only in the good state and so, efficiency is reached.
Principal. Assume that there is only one single profit-maximising principal that only
cares about his profit, is time consistent and risk-neutral. If the agent of reported type ˆ✓






where t0(ˆ✓) + t1(ˆ✓, q) is the total payment received.
Timing. The timing of contracting is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
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τ = 0 τ =1 τ = 2 τ = 3 τ = 4 τ = 5
At ⌧ = 0, belief ˜✓ is revealed to the agent and so, after this period there is asymmetric
information between the principal and the agent. At ⌧ = 1, the principal offers a contract
or a menu of contracts to the agent. At ⌧ = 2, the agent accepts or rejects the offer and
if accepts it also chooses the contract. If savings effort cost is incurred at date 0, then a
payment t0 can be made. At ⌧ = 3, ✓ and s are revealed to the agent. At ⌧ = 4, the
agent chooses whether to exert savings effort cost or not. At ⌧ = 5, the good q may be
consumed and conditional payment t1 is made.
2.4 Analysis
2.4.1 Agent’s choices
The self-1 type ✓ chooses whether to consume the good or not. Let V1s denote the value
of self-1 for s 2 {b, g}:
V1s(✓, t(
ˆ
✓), S0) = max
q2{0,1}
[( s✓   (1  S0) )q   S0   t0(ˆ✓)  t1(ˆ✓, q)]
= max{ s✓   (1  S0)   t1(ˆ✓, 1), t1(ˆ✓, 0)}  S0   t0(ˆ✓),
(2.1)
where q⇤s✓(S0, t(ˆ✓)) is the maximiser of the right-hand side.
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Equation (2.1) considers the following cases: incurring the savings effort cost at date
0 (S0 = 1) or not incurring at date 0 (S0 = 0). If S0 = 0 and q = 1, the consumer needs
to save at date 1 (S1 = 1). Note that when the consumer saves at date 0, the savings effort
cost is sunk for self-1.














where S⇤0(ˆ✓, ˜✓) is the maximiser of the right-hand side.
Note that the self-0 has valuation ✓ = 1. The agent’s type is only present in the
self-1 utility in order to capture the idea of time inconsistency. Consequently, for the
sophisticated and naïve types there is a disagreement between the self-0 and the self-1 in
terms of time preferences (✓). There is nevertheless an agreement between the self-0 and
the self-1 about the utility shock (although there is a asymmetry of information, because
the self-1 knows the utility shock as opposed to the self-0).3
2.4.2 Consumption constraints
As a preliminary step in our analysis, we find the agent’s consumption constraints. We
use backward induction to find when it will be optimal for the agent to consume the










1 if  s✓    + t1(ˆ✓, 1)
0 otherwise
,
3This agreement regarding shocks and disagreement on time preferences follows the utility specification
of Amador et al. (2006). Other authors, such as Galperti (2015), also use this specification.
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where t1(ˆ✓, 0) = 0 by assumption. That is, consumption will be chosen if the marginal
benefit of consuming the good is greater or equal to the sum of the effort cost of saving
and the payment. If the self-0 type ˜✓ has chosen S0 = 1, then it will be optimal for self-1









1 if  s✓   t1(ˆ✓, 1)
0 otherwise
.
Exploiting when it will be optimal for an agent to consume will help us substantially,
in the next subsections, to find the optimal contract(s). Suppose that the sophisticated
type accepts a PIA contract and the time-consistent and the naïve types accept a PAD
contract. A PIA contract requires a payment at date 0. Thus, the self-0 sophisticated type
needs to save at date 0 to pay t0(✓). In order to induce the self-1 sophisticated type to
consume, the principal needs to set
t1(✓, 1)   s✓.
That is, if the principal wants to induce consumption in the good state, then he needs to
set a payment at most equal to  g✓.
The time-consistent and the naïve types will prefer to save at date 1 in the good state
only, because saving earlier requires a savings effort cost at date 0, which leads to a loss
of flexibility. That is, both types will prefer to save and consume in the good state only
because  b < c +  which leads to a real welfare cost if the good is consumed in the
bad state. In order to induce the time-consistent type to consume in the good state, the
principal needs to set
t1(1, 1)   g    .
However, at this payment, the self-1 naïve type will choose not to consume. In order to
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induce the naïve type to consume in the good state, the principal needs to decrease the
payment to at most  g✓    . Therefore, the naïve type will restrict the principal when
choosing the payment of a PAD contract. The reason for this is that the self-1 naïve type
values the good less than the time-consistent type (and the self-0 naïve type).
If the principal cares about the agent’s consumption regardless of the type, then the
naïve type’s consumption constraint will be crucial in the maximisation problem. If the
principal cares only about the expected profit, then we need to analyse whether the prin-
cipal is better off by not inducing the naïve type to consume, even in the good state. Thus,
the naïve type’s consumption constraint can be ignored if the profit gained by inducing
the naïve type to consume does not compensate the cost of lowering the payment. The
incentives for the principal to induce the naïve type to consume decrease with the degree
of time inconsistency. That is, the principal needs to lower the payment of a PAD contract
to at most  g✓    . Thus, the closer ✓ is to zero (i.e. the more severe the degree of time
inconsistency), the lower the payment needed to induce the naïve type to consume the
good.
In standard models of price discrimination, the “high” value consumers receive in-
formational rents to prevent them from mimicking the “low” value consumers. In this
model, the self-0 time-consistent type is the high type because the self-1 time-consistent
type values the good more than the self-1 sophisticated and naïve types. If a menu of
contracts enables the sophisticated type to reach his self-0’s utility level, then it will also
be the case for the time-consistent type. The flexibility plays an important role because
it makes the time-consistent type better off by not choosing a contract that involves an
earlier payment.
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2.4.3 The principal’s problem
The principal offers a menu of contracts before knowing the type of agent and the realised
state. In order to maximise expected profit, the principal will construct a direct-revelation
mechanism where participation and truth-telling about the agent’s type belief are individ-















✓)))  cq⇤s✓(S0(˜✓, ˜✓), t(˜✓))]
s.t. for all (˜✓, ˆ✓) 2 ⇥2:
PC✓̃: V0(˜✓, ˜✓)   0
IC✓̃: V0(˜✓, ˜✓)   V0(ˆ✓, ˜✓).
(2.3)
PC are the participation constraints and IC are the ex-ante incentive compatibility
constraints. The IC constraints mean that an agent of type ˜✓ cannot not be worse off by
pretending to be of type ˆ✓ 6= ˜✓ and signing the contract assigned to that type. When
we rewrite the IC constraints for each type, the sophisticated type should be better off
accepting a contract t(✓) than accepting a contract t(1) and the reverse for the time-
consistent and the naïve types. Note that the IC constraint for the naïve type is based
on a wrong belief because the self-0 naïve type thinks that he is time-consistent. Given
his belief ˜✓, he must think that he will prefer the contract assigned to the time-consistent
type. Heidhues and Kőszegi (2010), in a different setup, have a similar condition that is
called perceived-choice constraint. This applies to our naïve type’s IC constraint.
2.4.3.1 Single contracts
To better understand the solution to the problem in (3), it is useful to solve the maximisa-
tion problem for a single contract before solving it for the menu of contracts. When only
one contract is offered, the IC constraints are satisfied; only the PC and the consumption
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constraints matter. We are most interested in the outcome when the agent consumes in
the good state only.
Proposition 2.1 shows that if the principal offers a single contract, then a single PIA
contract is profit-maximising when imposing consumption in the good state to all types
of agent and given  g   max{ p + c,
(1 p)
p(1 ✓) }. The condition  g  
 
p + c guarantees
that the expected profit when offering a single PIA contract is non-negative and  g  
(1 p)
p(1 ✓) guarantees that the principal’s expected profit is greater when offering a single
PIA contract than a single PAD contract.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose the principal offers a single contract {t0, t1(q)} such that con-
sumption in the good state is incurred. Then, for  g   max{ p + c,
(1 p)
p(1 ✓) }, the profit-
maximising single contract is a PIA contract. Further,
• The expected profit of the principal is
E(⇡)
PIA
= p( g   c)   .
• The payments are pt1(1) + t0 = p g    , with  b < t1(1)   g✓ and t0 > 0.
PROOF: (i) Suppose the principal offers a single PAD contract that does not involve
any earlier payment and hence, it is optimal for the agent to incur the savings effort
cost with probability p (i.e. S0 = 0). In order to induce the time-inconsistent types to
consume in the good state, the principal needs to set  b    < t1(1)   g✓    . The
principal wants to extract the maximum rent while inducing consumption in the good
state. Hence, t1(1) =  g✓  . The time-consistent type consumes in the good state only
because  g✓ >  b. At this payment and optimal consumption and saving decisions, the
principal’s expected profit is given by E(⇡)PAD = p( g✓      c).
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(ii) Suppose the principal offers a single PIA contract that involves an earlier payment
and hence, S0 = 1. All types will consume only in the good state if  b < t1(1)   g✓.
The principal sets a payment that extracts rent as much as possible while inducing all
types to consume in the good state. That is, V0(✓, ✓) = 0 , pt1(1)+ t0 = p g  , given
that the time-inconsistent types’ consumption constraints are satisfied (i.e. t1(1)   g✓)
and t0 > 0. The principal’s expected profit is given by
E(⇡)
PIA
= p(t1(1)  c) + t0 = p( g   c)   ,
which by assumption is non-negative. Further, by  g   (1 p)p(1 ✓) , E(⇡)
PIA   E(⇡)PAD.
The proposition shows that by restricting the number of contracts to a single PIA
contract that induces the self-1 sophisticated type to commit to consumption in the good
state, the principal also induces the naïve type to consume in the good state. However,
this is achieved at the expense of flexibility. Whilst in a PAD contract the savings effort
cost is incurred with probability p, in a PIA contract the savings effort cost is incurred
with probability 1.
Furthermore, the closer ✓ is to zero, the more likely it is for the condition  g  
(1 p)
p(1 ✓) to hold. That is, the higher the degree of time inconsistency, the better is for
the principal to offer a single PIA contract. This is because, under a PAD contract, the
principal would need to lower the payment enough such that the time-inconsistent types
would be induced to consume in the good state without being able to extract rent at
date 0. Consequently, under a certain degree of time inconsistency, it is better for the
principal to offer a single PIA contract. This shows that if the principal does not take
into consideration that the agent might have dynamically inconsistent preferences when
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designing a contract, the result can be inefficient. Hereafter, we will focus on inducing
the sophisticated type to accept a PIA contract.
Proposition 2.1 imposes the consumption constraints to the problem in (3). If the
consumption constraints of the naïve and the sophisticated type are ignored, then a single
PIA contract may not be profit-maximising. Indeed, Proposition 2.2 examines under
what condition will be profit-maximising to offer a single PIA contract that imposes
consumption in comparison to a case where the consumption constraints are not imposed.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose the principal offers a single contract. Then, for  g   (1 ⌫1p)(1 ⌫1)p +
c, the profit-maximising contract is a single PIA contract that induces all types to con-
sume in the good state and the consumption constraints are not imposed.
PROOF: As shown in Proposition 2.1, the expected profit when offering a single
PIA contract that induces consumption only in the good state to all types is E(⇡) =
p( g   c)  . Now, we drop the consumption constraints. If the principal sets payments
such that no type of agent consumes in the good state, then the expected profit is zero.
Further, optimal consumption decisions for the sophisticated and the naïve types will be
the same in a single contract. Hence, it is enough to analyse the case where only the
time-consistent type consumes. In this case, the principal offers a single PAD contract
since it does not involve a welfare loss. The principal needs to set t1(1)   g    to
induce consumption. Therefore, t1(1) =  g    and the expected profit is given by
E(⇡) = ⌫1p( g      c)   0 (by  g >  + c). Hence, a single PIA contract is profit-
maximising if p( g   c)     ⌫1p( g      c) ,  g   (1 ⌫1p)(1 ⌫1)p + c.
Proposition 2.2 shows that if the probability of the agent being time-consistent type is
low enough (i.e. ⌫1 is low enough) and the probability of the good state is high enough,
then it is optimal for the principal to offer a single PIA contract.
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2.4.3.2 Menu of contracts
Now we are interested in solving the maximisation problem in (2.3) when the principal
offers a menu of contracts composed of a PIA and a PAD contracts. The following
proposition identifies two possible cases that arise when the principal offers a menu of
contracts.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose the principal offers a menu of contracts {t(✓), t(1)}. Let t(✓)
be a PIA contract and t(1) be a PAD contract. Two possible cases arise.
• If the naïve type’s consumption constraint is ignored, then only the sophisticated
and the time-consistent types consume. The payments are t1(1, 1) =  g    and
pt1(✓, 1)+ t0(✓) = p g  , with  b < t1(✓, 1)   g✓ and t0(✓) > 0. The expected
profit of the principal is
E(⇡)
1
= ⌫1p( g      c) + ⌫2(p( g   c)   ).
• If the naïve type’s consumption constraint is imposed, then all types consume. The
payments are t1(1, 1) =  g✓    and pt1(✓, 1) + t0(✓) = p g✓    , with  b <
t1(✓, 1)   g✓ and t0(✓) > 0. The expected profit of the principal is
E(⇡)
2
= p( g✓      c)  (1  p)⌫2 .
When  g   (1 ⌫1 ⌫2)(✓ ⌫1 ⌫2)( + c), it is profit-maximising for the principal to offer a menu of
contracts where all types consume: E(⇡)2   E(⇡)1.
PROOF: (i) Suppose that the naïve type’s consumption constraint is ignored. First, we
want to show that the menu of contracts with payments t1(1, 1) =  g   and pt1(✓, 1)+
t0(✓) = p g  , with  b < t1(✓, 1)   g✓ and t0(✓) > 0, satisfies PC and IC constraints.
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If the self-0 time-consistent type accepts t(1), then it is only induced to consume in
the good state and it chooses to incur the savings effort cost at date 1 with probability p,
obtaining V0(1, 1) = p( g      t1(1, 1)) = 0. If it accepts t(✓), it consumes only in
the good state (by  b <  g✓) and incurs the savings effort cost at date 0, obtaining utility
V0(✓, 1) = p( g   t1(✓, 1))      t0(✓) = 0. The self-0 utilities are the same, meaning
that the self-0 time-consistent type is indifferent and hence, the IC1 is satisfied.
If the self-0 sophisticated type accepts t(✓), then it is induced to consume in the good
state only and it obtains V0(✓, ✓) = p( g   t1(✓, 1))      t0(✓) = 0. If it accepts t(1),
it does not consume and obtains V0(1, ✓) = 0 because t1(1, 1) >  g✓    . The self-0
utilities from both contracts are the same, meaning that the self-0 sophisticated type is
indifferent and so, the IC✓ is satisfied.
Consequently, PC and IC constraints are satisfied. Note that the self-0 naïve type
behaves as the time-consistent type by accepting t(1), but does not consume at date 1.
The principal’s expected profit is E(⇡)1 = ⌫1p( g   c)+⌫2(p( g c)  ). Since the
principal extracts full rent from the sophisticated and time-consistent types, the expected
profit cannot be increased. The expected profit could be increased if it was possible to
reduce two inefficiencies, which are that the sophisticated type saves at date 0 and the
naïve type does not consume. The only way of avoiding the sophisticated type not to
save at date 0 is by inducing it to accept a PAD contract or by simply offering a single
PAD contract to all types as analysed in Proposition 2.1. We rule out this case as we are
analysing the case where the principal offers a menu of contracts.
(ii) Now we add the naïve type’s consumption constraint to the problem in (2.3). In
order to induce positive consumption, the principal needs to set:  b < t1(✓, 1)   g✓
and t1(1, 1) =  g✓    . If the self-0 sophisticated type accepts t(✓), then V0(✓, ✓) =
p g      t0(✓)   pt1(✓, 1). If it accepts t(1), then V0(1, ✓) = p( g      t1(1, 1)) =
p g(1   ✓). Using IC✓, V0(✓, ✓)   V0(1, ✓) , pt1(✓, 1) + t0(✓)  p g✓    . To
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extract maximum rent, the principal sets pt1(✓, 1) + t0(✓) = p g✓    . Under t(1)
and t(✓), V0(✓, ✓)   V0(1, ✓) ,  (1   p)  0, and hence, the IC✓ is satisfied. The
time-consistent and the naïve types accept t(1) as it involves a savings effort cost with
probability p, obtaining V0(1, 1) = p g(1  ✓). Hence, all types enjoy the same positive
rent at date 0. The principal’s expected profit is E(⇡)2 = p( g✓      c)  (1  p)⌫2 .
Finally, E(⇡)2   E(⇡)1 , p( g✓      c)   (1   p)⌫2   ⌫1p( g      c) +
⌫2(p( g   c)   ) which holds when  g   (1 ⌫1 ⌫2)(✓ ⌫1 ⌫2)( + c).
Proposition 2.3 shows that if we do not impose the additional naïve type’s consump-
tion constraint, the principal can offer a menu of contracts composed of a PIA and a PAD
contracts while extracting all rents from the sophisticated and the time-consistent types.
Once the naïve type’s consumption constraint is added to the maximisation problem, the
self-0 naïve type behaves as the time-consistent type and hence, the principal needs to
lower t1(1, 1) enough to induce the naïve type to consume. In addition, if we were to
impose a binding PC✓, then IC✓ would not be satisfied and the sophisticated type would
be better off with a PAD contract. The principal also needs to decrease the sum of pay-
ments pt(✓, 1) + t0(✓) in order to satisfy IC✓. Therefore, all types enjoy a positive rent
from date 0 perspective. Hence, there is a trade-off between increasing efficiency and
decreasing information rent. This is similar to the trade-off in standard contract theory.
However, in our model this trade-off occurs partially at date 0 preferences and partially
at date 1 preferences. The self-0 utilities of all types of agent are the same, but the self-1
utilities differ. In particular, the self-1 time-consistent type’s utility is  g(1 ✓) > 0 if the
good state realises and zero otherwise, whereas the self-1 naïve type’s utility is zero in
both states and the self-1 sophisticated type’s utility will depend on the payments, but it
is smaller than the self-1 time-consistent type’s utility. Further, the self-1 time-consistent
type’s utility is zero in both states if the principal offers a menu of contracts where the
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naïve type does not consume.
Proposition 2.3 also compares the expected profits of both cases. If the probability of
the naïve type is high enough, then it is profit-maximising to the principal to decrease the
payments even if that implies a positive rent. The closer ✓ is to one, the more likely is for
the condition  g   (1 ⌫1 ⌫2)(✓ ⌫1 ⌫2)( + c) to hold. That is, the lower the degree of time incon-
sistency, the better is for the principal to offer a menu of contracts that induces positive
consumption to all types. This is because the lower the degree of time inconsistency, the
greater t1(1, 1) and the lower the information rent. Further, the principal gains from the
naïve type’s positive consumption.
Given that we are interested in the outcome where the agent consumes in the good
state, it is natural to ask under what condition will a single PIA contract generate greater
(or lower) expected profit than a menu of contracts that induces all types to consume.
Proposition 2.4 compares the expected profit obtained when offering a single PIA con-
tract (i.e. E(⇡)PIA = p( g   c)    ) with the expected profit obtained when offering a
menu of contracts (i.e. E(⇡)2 = p( g✓      c)  (1  p)⌫2 ).
Proposition 2.4. When  g   (1 p)(1 ⌫2)p(1 ✓)  , it is profit-maximising for the principal to
offer a single PIA contract instead of a menu of contracts that imposes positive consump-
tion to all types.
A single PIA contract involves a welfare loss since the time-consistent and the naïve
types have to incur savings effort cost with probability one. Whilst the menu of con-
tracts does not involve the same welfare loss for the time-consistent and the naïve types,
it requires a positive rent. The closer ⌫2 is to one (i.e. the greater the probability of
the sophisticated type) and the closer ✓ is to zero, the more likely is for the condition
 g   (1 p)(1 ⌫2)p(1 ✓)  to hold. This is because the greater the degree of time inconsistency,
the lower t1(1, 1) in the menu of contracts and consequently, the lower the respective
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expected profit. Further, a single PIA contract becomes more relevant the greater the
probability of the sophisticated type.
In addition, if the probability of the naïve type is zero, the principal could offer a
menu of contracts without giving a positive rent, as shown in Proposition 2.3. Thus, the
presence of the naïve type has implications on the optimal contract. We analyse this in
more detail in the next section.
2.5 Discussion
In this section, we analyse the impact of naiveté on the optimal contract, principal’s
expected profit, consumption and savings decisions and agent’s consumer surplus. In
particular, we compare the results above with the same model but without the naïve type
or more precisely where the naïve type is now a fully sophisticated type. Furthermore,
we have our attention to those contracts that induce positive consumption in the good
state.
2.5.1 Model without the naïve type
Assume that the agent is time-consistent or sophisticated with respective probabilities,
⌫
0
1 = ⌫1 and ⌫ 02 = ⌫2 + ⌫3, with ⌫ 01 + ⌫ 02 = 1 and where ⌫3 = 1   ⌫1   ⌫2. That is, we
have transformed the naïve type into a sophisticated type. If the principal offers a menu
of contracts, the payments will be the same as in case 1 in Proposition 2.3, i.e. t1(1, 1) =
 g    and pt1(✓, 1) + t1(✓) = p g    with t0 > 0 and  b < t1(✓, 1)   g✓ such that
the sophisticated type accepts a PIA contract and the time-consistent type accepts a PAD
contract. In this case, the principal’s expected profit is ⌫ 01p( g   c)+⌫ 02(p( g c)  ).
If the principal offers a single PIA contract, then the payments and the expected profit
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will be as in Proposition 2.1, which is smaller than the expected profit obtained under a
menu of contracts.
The principal can also offer a single PAD contract as before. Under such a contract,




it is profit-maximising for the principal to offer a menu of contracts instead of a PAD
contract. Hence, if the degree of time inconsistency is severe it is better for the principal
to offer a menu of contracts. As before, we are most interested in the case where the
difference between time-consistent and time-inconsistent types is significant and so, we
are interested in comparing the case without the naïve type when the principal offers a
menu of contracts with the case with the naïve type and where the principal might offer
a single PIA contract or a menu of contracts.
2.5.2 Impact of naiveté on the principal’s expected profit
We first analyse the impact of the naïve type on the principal’s expected profits. If the
principal offers a single PIA contract, the expected profit is p( g c)  , which is smaller
than the expected profit without the naïve type. On the other hand, if the principal offers
a menu of contracts, then, for  g   (1 p)(1 ⌫1 ⌫2)p(1 ✓)  , the expected profit obtained without
the naïve type is greater. However, as shown in Proposition 2.4, when  g   (1 p)(1 ⌫2)p(1 ✓)  
it is profit-maximising for the principal to offer a single PIA contract instead of a menu
of contracts. Given that the expected profit without the naïve type is greater than with the
naïve type when offering a single PIA contract, the principal will be better off without
the naïve type.
This finding raises an interesting point that we have not explored so far which is the
source of consumer beliefs and whether it is possible for consumers to learn about their
preferences from their own behaviour or from the firm. In our model, beliefs about the
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type are exogenous and hence, our model cannot easily accommodate learning. Nev-
ertheless, our model shows that the principal may have incentives to educate the naïve
type since it can increase expected profit if the naïve type behaves as the sophisticated
type. This contrasts with a theoretical discussion in Spiegler (2011) about educating
naïve consumers, focusing on the case where a firm does not have incentives to educate
naïve consumers since it cannot generate increased profits. We note, however, that if the
costs associated with educating the naïve type about his degree of time inconsistency are
greater than the incremental profit, then the principal no longer has incentives to educate
the naïve type into a sophisticated type. Nevertheless, exploring how the principal can
increase the naïve type’s awareness is outside of scope of this paper.4
2.5.3 Impact of naiveté on the agent’s utility
We are now interested in the agent’s utility and consumption and saving decisions. In
terms of consumption, there is no impact of the naïve type on the remaining types be-
cause those types are always induced to consume in the good state. There is, however, a
potential impact on the saving decision of the time-consistent type. If the principal offers
a single PIA contract, then the time-consistent type needs to save in both states, which
leads to a welfare loss. Whereas in a model without the naïve type, the principal offers a
menu of contracts which allows the time-consistent type to save only in the good state.
Although there might not be an impact of the naïve type on the remaining types in
terms of consumption and saving decisions, there might be an effect on the consumer sur-
plus. In order to compare the consumer surplus of the non-naïve types with and without
4We note, however, that empirical literature has shown that feedbacks/reminders can be effective in
increasing awareness in self-control (see e.g. Cadena et al. 2011, Karlan et al. 2016 and Kast et al. 2012).
Further, the ability of firms collecting data about consumers’ tastes and preferences, in particular informa-
tion over past consumption and levels of satisfaction, is increasing in different markets. The access to more
detailed information could allow a firm to send individualised feedbacks/reminders to those consumers
closely related to a naïve type.
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the naïve type, we need to decide which self to favour. Welfare judgements are con-
ceptually problematic when agents have time-inconsistent preferences because there are
two selves and it is not trivial which self to use. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) favours
the long-run self, which in our case corresponds to the self-0 agent. The same is fol-
lowed by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) and Galperti (2015). Although there is an
open debate regarding welfare measures in non-standard models of choice, we follow the
literature and analyse the agent’s welfare from the perspective of self-0.
When the principal offers a single PIA contract, all types obtain V0 = 0. The same
does not apply if the principal offers a menu of contracts. In this case, all self-0 types
obtain utility p g(1   ✓) > 0. Hence, all self-0 types are better off with a menu of
contracts than with a single PIA contract. Furthermore, in a model without the naïve type,
the principal extracts full rent from the self-0 sophisticated and time-consistent types via
a menu of contracts. Therefore, both self-0 types are better off under the presence of the
naïve type if it is profit-maximising for the principal to offer a menu of contracts.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed the contract design of a profit-maximising principal that
sells a good to an agent that can be time-consistent, sophisticated or naïve type. The
self-0 naïve type behaves as the time-consistent type, but his self-1 values consumption
less. The principal needs to decrease the payments sufficiently to attract the naïve type to
consume. We focus our attention on specific contract forms, a pay-in-advance (PIA) and
a pay-after-delivery (PAD) contracts. We conclude that a single PIA contract can induce
positive consumption in the good state while extracting full information rent. However,
it imposes a welfare loss given that all types of agent need to incur a savings effort cost
even if the bad state realises. We compare this contract to a menu of contracts that also
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induces positive consumption to all types, however it requires an information rent that it
increases with the severity of the degree of time inconsistency.
Finally, we analyse the impact of the naïve type on the expected profit and the remain-
ing types’ utilities. We show that the principal may have incentives to educate the naïve
type since he can increase the expected profit if the naïve type is aware of his degree of
time inconsistency. The reason behind this result is that in order to induce the naïve type
to consume, the principal needs to decrease the payments sufficiently, which in turn leads
to a positive information rent.
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prepayment energy consumers: A
behavioural approach1
3.1 Introduction
Research in economics and psychology suggests that most choices involve intertemporal
trade-offs between immediate and delayed costs or benefits (Frederick et al. 2002). In
order to evaluate such trade-offs, decision makers compare the costs and the benefits that
occur at different times. However, people can be impatient in the sense that they like to
enjoy immediate rewards and to defer costs (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Strotz (1956)
was the first to model impatience for near-term trade-offs rather than for future ones,
modelling it as a commitment device. He showed that under exponential discounting
preferences are time consistent, but under non-exponential discounting agents may prefer
to constrain their own choices.
Self-control plays an important role in explaining inconsistencies for the future over
time and across activities (Lowenstein 2000). People with high levels of self-control are
1This is joint work with Michelle Baddeley and Michael Pollitt.
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able to stay on diets, exercise regularly and to lead their lives within their means, whereas
those that lack self-control end up not achieving their aims (Laibson 1997). In order to
constrain future choices and to obtain a desired outcome, people impose commitment
devices that facilitate the achievement of goals (Brocas et al. 2004; Bryan et al. 2010).
It has been shown that commitment devices are effective in improving performance in
school (Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002), in saving money (Ashraf et al. 2006; Benartzi
and Thaler 2004), in the context of addictions (Bernheim and Rangel 2004), etc.
Prepayment metering is an interesting case to study intertemporal trade-offs. Prepay-
ment is a payment method where the payment is made before the actual consumption;
that is, consumers have to pay for electricity and/or gas (immediate costs) before they
consume it (delayed benefits). Moreover, consumers must plan in advance their future
consumption. This planning, or lack of it, may lead to self-disconnection, which happens
when consumers exhaust all available credit in their meter and are left without supply of
energy for a certain period. Self-disconnection has serious consequences for the well-
being of consumers, such as lack of heating; impacts on food preparation; leisure and
psychological impacts, e.g. shame or loss of self-esteem (Consumer Focus 2010). Like-
wise, self-disconnection generates costs for the energy suppliers since it may contribute
to lower energy consumption, higher debt levels and higher costs related to reconnection
of energy supply.
The aim of this paper is to propose a mechanism that minimises the number of self-
disconnections through commitment and awareness. This paper has implications not only
for the more efficient use of prepayment in energy, but has also implications for poverty.
In fact, self-disconnection is especially pronounced among low-income households and
has been linked to fuel poverty (Brutscher 2012b; O’Sullivan 2013). Fuel poverty is
usually defined as the inability to keep an adequate level of warmth on 10% of household
income and has been regarded as a likely contributor to increased winter mortality rates
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(O’Sullivan et al. 2013). If we find a mechanism that minimises the number of self-
disconnections, then we can contribute to a better energy comfort for those households
who fall in the category of fuel poor, reducing the negative consequences of fuel poverty.
First, we design a mechanism that induces higher rates of savings committed to en-
ergy consumption and that decreases the likelihood of consumers to self-disconnect.
Consumers differ in their degree of self-control and in their willingness to accept a com-
mitment device. The energy supply firm does not know the different degrees of self-
control amongst consumers and so needs to target consumers effectively. The mechanism
is composed of a commitment contract and an energy consumption reminder in order to
account for the heterogeneity of consumers and their private information. We propose
a commitment contract for consumers who lack self-control but their awareness makes
them sophisticated enough to engage in such a contract, and a feedback/reminder to those
consumers who are not aware of their lack of self-control. Second, we empirically ex-
amine the determinants of self-disconnection and the choice of different commitment
contracts using data from a representative survey that we have designed for this purpose.
The survey was applied to a subset of British Gas consumers who use a gas prepayment
meter. British Gas is one of the largest retailers in the UK, providing service to approxi-
mately 15.9 million energy households.
We find that self-control problems play a role in self-disconnection. We are able to
identify those consumers who would benefit from a commitment contract. Moreover, we
show that there is a demand for commitment and saving opportunities among consumers.
These findings demonstrate that there is a scope to introduce a commitment contract. The
prepayment meter can be used as a flexible self-commitment device and in fact a signifi-
cant share of consumers use the prepayment meter as a device to control energy expenses.
However, prepayment meters alone cannot prevent self-disconnection completely. This
Chapter 3. Addressing self-disconnection among prepayment energy consumers: A
behavioural approach
59
emphasises the need for a commitment contract that increases the control over energy ex-
penses. Overall, we show that there is an interest over the different commitment saving
contracts, and that a significant share of consumers would prefer to smooth their energy
expenditures if a commitment contract enabled them to do so.
3.2 Background on prepayment energy
Prepayment consumers insert credit into their meters by the use of a key or card that
is then used or spent when electricity or gas is consumed in the home. This allows
the consumer to decide the amount of energy to be consumed beforehand, as happens
commonly with mobile phone services.
Prepayment meters (PPMs) emerged as a mean of offering indebted domestic con-
sumers the ability to pay their energy bills. Countries such as UK, South Africa, Mozam-
bique, Canada, Australia, among others, offer this type of payment in the “energy sector”.
In Great Britain, the number of PPM customers increased, by 2012, to around 4.2 million
household electricity customer accounts (15.5% of the total) and 3 million household gas
customer accounts (13.3% of the total) (Ofgem 2015).2
One important feature of PPMs is that, when the credit is exhausted, the supply of
energy can be interrupted. In a stricter definition, self-disconnection happens when the
consumer has exhausted all the available credit, including the emergency credit. The
emergency credit is a fixed value (usually £5 in UK) of gas or electricity that is made
available, at no extra cost, when consumers run out of credit and was created to overcome
self-disconnection. However, other alternatives are also offered. One example is friendly
credit - certain periods over the day in which suppliers do not disconnect whatever the
2The number of PPMs continued to increase in 2014. There were 4.5 million electricity PPM customer
accounts and around 3.4 million gas customer accounts in 2014. (Ofgem 2015).
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consumer’s usage or credit status. These options give more time for consumers to top up
their card.
Different reasons have been given in order to explain self-rationing and self-disconnection:
inconvenience/transport costs, forgetting to top up, financial constraints or coordination
issues (Brutscher 2012b; O’Sullivan et al. 2013; Consumer Focus 2010). In situations
in which the reasons are a lack of opportunity to go to an outlet; forgetting to top up;
or coordination issues within the household - options like emergency credit or friendly
credit are good solutions. Conversely, if we consider financial constraints, identified by
Brutscher (2012b) as the main driver of self-disconnection, such solutions may just post-
pone the problem rather than fix it. On the one hand, it can provide more credit flexibility
by providing additional help for those who do not have money available, but on the other
hand, it does not help consumers with more severe problems and/or who lack self-control.
Self-disconnection implies that households opt to have discrete jumps in energy con-
sumption rather than smoothing consumption throughout the year. Brutscher (2012b)
analyses this puzzle and argues that a possible explanation is preference reversals (usu-
ally associated with self-control problems) that end up affecting consumers’ ability to
save. In the UK, self-disconnection happens mostly during the autumn/winter for gas
consumption since energy expenditure tends to be greater than in the spring/summer due
to heating. During the winter, consumers might realise that they need to save in order
to avoid self-disconnection, but as soon as the summer arrives they have a different set
of preferences. Those households who exhibit impatience during the summer can fail to
have the sufficient liquidity to purchase enough credit during the winter, which affects
their tendency to self-disconnect.
Building on Brutscher’s (2012b) findings, we propose a mechanism composed of a
commitment contract and a reminder to induce higher rates of savings and consequently,
decrease the likelihood of self-disconnection.
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3.3 A mechanism to minimise self-disconnection
We start by analysing the type of consumers that we need to target in order to reduce
self-disconnections. In the literature on self-control, there is a major distinction between
sophisticated and naïve agents. Sophisticated agents are aware of their lack of future self-
control whereas naïve agents are unaware (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, 2001)3. Agents
unaware of their self-control problems will repeatedly procrastinate believing that they
will act tomorrow. This heterogeneity among agents, in our case consumers, complicates
the incentive design since optimal incentives differ for different types of agents. Sophis-
ticated consumers will easily accept an energy commitment contract. Naïve consumers
are less likely to accept an energy commitment contract since they have incorrect percep-
tions about future behaviour. As Brutscher (2012a) points out household energy, like all
household expenditure, may involve complicated family dynamics where the presence
of a commitment device may allow a sophisticated agent within the family to prevent a
naïve agent from acting inconsistently with family resources, e.g. a husband/wife spend-
ing money on summer time other than allowing the wife/husband to save for winter fuel.
A firm serving a mixed group of consumers does not usually know the degree of self-
control of the individual consumers and so, it needs to offer a different type of incentive
for the naïve. In order to induce these consumers to accept a commitment contract or at
least to increase their level of awareness, we propose an energy consumption reminder.
Overall, the consumers that we wish to target (1) are more likely to have self-control
issues as opposed to consumers that do not act inconsistently; (2) can afford the spare
cash required in order to increase their savings; and (3) have higher personal self-disconnection
3O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001) and Laibson (1997) analyse the existence of cognitive be-
havioural issues that lead for a need of a commitment device through a (quasi)-hyperbolic model. Other
important works are based on temptation (Gul and Pesendorfer 2001), dual-self (Fudenberg and Levine
2006) and limited attention (Karlan et al. 2016).
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or self-rationing costs than benefits, i.e. they, together with the firm, should benefit from
minimising self-disconnection.
3.3.1 Commitment contract
The ideal commitment contract to offer to energy consumers would be one that provides
maximal consumption smoothing. However, there are challenges when developing a
contract that involves a commitment product.
First, one needs to consider the trade-off between commitment and flexibility. As
pointed out in Ashraf et al. (2003), individuals demand highly liquid saving devices,
but they also need a certain degree of commitment. Thus, there is a trade-off between
flexibility and commitment that will vary according to the customer’s self-control.
Second, we need to consider whether there is a concern about exploitation of con-
sumers. From a consumer perspective, if a household accepts the commitment contract
offered by a firm, then it is because it will benefit from it, otherwise it would not accept it.
Interestingly, in the present case, a commitment contract, if successful, can decrease costs
associated with self-disconnection for the consumers (in terms of energy discomfort) and
the firm (in terms of the costs of dealing with disconnection/debt collection).4
Based on these concerns, we propose four types of commitment contracts that can
work in the context of prepayment energy. As in Beshears et al. (2013), we consider
different contracts with different degrees of flexibility and saving targets (see Table 3.1).
The essence of these contracts is straightforward: households commit to allocate a por-
tion of each top-up into savings to use in future energy expenditure. In the contracts’
4This is opposed to the literature on the exploitation of self-control problems of consumers by a firm. In
this literature, a firm can extract rents from the consumers due to its cognitive issues, and consumer surplus
is scaled down (see for example Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006). The intuition is that the agent who accepts
an exploitative contract expects that he will extract rents from the principal and the principal expects the
reverse. Naïve agents accept the exploitative contract and end up consuming more than they initially
wanted. This is opposed to our case because initially the sophisticated and naïve want to consume more
energy during the winter period than they actually end up consuming if no commitment contract is offered.
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design, we have assumed two periods: period 0 corresponds to the spring/summer where
the commitment is made, and period 1 corresponds to the autumn/winter where self-
disconnection is reduced. The contracts here proposed are the following ones.
Regular payments throughout year. Based on a summary of the previous year’s
consumption, the customer agrees to an equal weekly/monthly amount and commits to a
payment schedule through the year. This contract implies a significant loss of flexibility.
Voluntary savings target. The customer chooses a target amount that they feel com-
fortable/confident about saving. The customer is responsible for meeting this target and
it is up to them whether it is achieved each month. The credit saved can be used to offset
winter consumption. The customer is free to choose how much to save in each week, but
postponing savings is allowed.
Ad-hoc extra payments. The customer makes additional payments as and when
they can afford to do so. The customer would not have to nominate a target for savings,
but the more that is saved the more winter consumption would be offset. This is the
plan that offers the most flexibility of all commitment contracts, although it is not a real
commitment, only an awareness device.
Summer fixed extra payments. The customer commits to additional fixed payments
just during summer months. These additional payments could be calculated on the ba-
sis of wintertime gas consumption in the previous year, not necessarily equal payments
throughout the year. The extra payments would be used to cover higher gas payments in
the wintertime.
Table 3.1 shows the main differences in terms of flexibility and saving target for the
four types of commitment contract. Flexibility is either low or medium because in all
contracts, the consumer has to insert extra credit in the meter that can only be used for
gas or electricity expenses. This is in contrast with the energy consumption reminder that,
as we will discuss in the next section, has a high degree of flexibility and no-predefined




TABLE 3.1: Main features of the commitment contracts
Regular payments Voluntary savings Ad-hoc extra Summer fixed
throughout year target payments extra payments
Flexibility Low Medium Medium Low
Saving target Yes Yes No Yes
(set by the firm) (set by the consumer) (set by the consumer)
In order to avoid attrition, the following restriction could be imposed: “Savings can
only be consumed in the following period”. This can be done, if feasible in both technical
and regulatory terms, through a second card used to insert and lock the savings or via
an online “commitment store”, e.g. stickK.com.5 If consumers need to withdraw their
savings, then they need to contact the firm. By creating more transaction costs, consumers
have the incentives to break the commitment only for reasons such as unexpected shocks
as opposed to procrastination or impulse/temptation.
It could be that fixing/locking an amount of credit in the prepayment card is not
possible for technical reasons or simply not allowed by the authorities. In this case, one
can minimise the number of withdrawals before time through a reward/incentive. In some
of the proposed contracts, a minimum saving requirement is explicitly assumed. In order
to emphasize the importance of such a requirement, a reward to save can be introduced.
In the beginning of period 0, the consumer chooses a “fixed” goal amount of savings to
accumulate during period 0. If, at the beginning of period 1, the goal has been reached,
then the reward is given. We can also impose, if necessary, a further requirement: no
5stickK.com is a website that provides commitment contracts to the general public. The idea is that
people choose a goal/target for changing an aspect of their behaviour (e.g. stop smoking), make a public
commitment to change, and in some cases put up a financial stake that they are prepared to lose if they fail.
Other websites of this type are fatbet.net and www.dietbetter.com.
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self-disconnection. This can be achieved through the use of a reward that is offered to
the customer if they do not self-disconnect during the winter.
Note that these rewards should not be very high/attractive for three reasons. First,
consumers may just accept because the effective price of energy has been changed,
rather than because of a “behavioural” change. Second, we want to ensure that those
consumers whose costs (in terms of energy discomfort) are higher than the benefits of
self-disconnection (in terms of extra money saved from not consuming energy during a
certain period) are targeted to receive the commitment contract. Third, the reward implies
costs to the firm that should not be exceeded by the benefits associated with the lower
number of self-disconnections, otherwise the firm will not have an incentive to offer a
commitment contract.
A further concern that may arise regards competition issues and lock-in effects (i.e.
when the firm makes it extremely hard for the consumers to leave them). Given that the
consumers are free to choose their type of contract, if the firm continues offering the
conventional prepayment method (among others), then the consumers are always free to
switch type of contract, besides being able to switch firm.
3.3.2 Reminder/Feedback on consumption
We suggest a reminder or feedback in order to attract consumers who do not accept a
commitment contract due to their poor self-control. The idea is that the energy supply
firm would increase consumers’ awareness regarding the need to top up regularly.
So far, we have assumed that self-disconnection is associated with an incomplete task,
where this task is the accumulation of savings for future energy expenditure. A commit-
ment device is used to increase the chances of successfully completing the task. However,
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perhaps the problem is that, in certain periods, consumers forget that their energy expen-
diture in the winter is greater than in the summer, which, leads to over consumption
or under saving. Then, when winter arrives, the consumer faces the second-best option
of reducing energy consumption. It may also be that consumers do not recognize their
future expenditure because they do not value heating as much as their future self does
and so, they assume that energy expenditure will be roughly the same. Consequently,
a further explanation for self-disconnection is that consumers may suffer from limited
attention/memory.
A reminder can be effective because time inconsistency, under this argument, is de-
rived from a failure to forecast future expenditure leading to less consumption smoothing
than would occur under perfect foresight (Karlan et al. 2016). A reminder/feedback im-
plies voluntary and selective attention from the consumer given that they want to save for
future energy consumption.
In the prepayment energy context, a reminder on consumption could be as follows:
“Last year you spent £20 on gas between July and September and you spent £120 on gas
between October and December”. The reminder/feedback can be extended by introduc-
ing a saving cue, e.g. “By saving extra £50 during the summer time, you can smooth
your gas expenses throughout the year”. The reminder could be sent by e-mail or mo-
bile SMS during period 0. Interestingly, if the consumer does not wish to consume more
energy during the winter, then self-rationing is not driven by reasons of dynamic inconsis-
tency or by limited attention issues. The consumers who choose rationally to self-ration
are those that we do not need to target since their benefits from self-rationing and self-
disconnecting are greater than their costs. We want to target those consumers whose costs
exceed benefits because they are the ones who will benefit from a commitment contract.




The data source used for examining the mechanism is from a survey developed in col-
laboration with British Gas (BG) designed specifically for prepayment gas consumers.
The survey was available online between January and February 2013 and was sent via
email to 20,000 consumers (11% of surveys were undelivered). Surveys with a significant
small number of responses were dropped from the database. In total, we obtained 1541
usable responses, however in certain questions we had a lower number of observations
for estimation purposes.
The survey, designed to be representative of the prepayment consumers and fielded
accordingly, included a series of detailed questions about the respondent’s saving plan
choice and demographics (age, gender, education, household size and income). A wide
range of revealed preference questions to assess self-disconnection, saving behaviour,
topping-up behaviour, opinions about the prepayment meter,6 and questions to measure
self-control were also included. For a summary of the main variables employed in the
paper see appendix, Table A1.
Regarding the questions on the preferences about the saving plan, we did not ask
open-ended questions (e.g. “Do you want to make more spread and similar payments
throughout the year?”). Instead, we gave a specific text for each of the saving plans,
similar to the contracts’ description in section 3.3.1 and asked the respondents which of
the plans they would prefer (see Appendix for the questions related to the saving plan
choice). This type of questions is usually referred to as stated preference questions. Re-
vealed preference data does not exist for new products, which is the case for the saving
plans that we propose in this paper. Thus, stated preference questions can be used to
obtain hypothetical data and estimate the attractiveness of the saving plans. Precisely
6Although, we have asked questions to assess their opinions over prepayment meter, we did not use
them for the empirical analysis.
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because this type of questions involve hypothetical scenarios they also involve some lim-
itations: (1) respondents may find some trade-offs difficult to evaluate because they are
unfamiliar with the suggested saving plans; and (2) once the number of attributes in-
creases, the complexity and the number of comparisons increase, which may lead to a
loss of interest from the respondent. For these reasons we took great care in explaining
the different plans in detail and focus on differences in attribute levels. The attribute lev-
els (i.e. level of flexibility and saving target) for the commitment contracts are presented
in Table 3.1. The reminder/feedback has the following attribute levels: high level of flex-
ibility and no saving target. We included in the survey one extra alternative (“none of
the options”) that we use as our main reference choice, which is valid as a constant for
all respondents given that they were all using the same payment method at the moment
of the survey and acts as a status quo alternative. The absence of a status quo alternative
would bias interest in saving options upwards.
Socio-Economic Variables. Table 3.2 compares the age and gender of the respon-
dents of the survey with the group of consumers who have a contract with BG for the
supply of gas through a prepayment meter. Our sample is representative with small dif-
ferences in the number of consumers aged between 22 and 34 years old and between 45
and 54 years old.
TABLE 3.2: Survey sample: control variables
Category Survey sample (%) PPM Gas in BG (%)a
Gender Male 37.8 39.4
Female 62.2 59.4
Age 21 and Under 0.2 2.2
22 to 34 5.6 25.9
35 to 44 20.7 24.4
45 to 54 38.5 24.7
55 to 64 25 13.8
65 and Over 9.9 9.1
a This information was made available by BG and corresponds to the same period as our survey.
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Table 3.3 shows the means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the socio-
economic variables. The consumers in the sample are, on average, between 45 and 54
years old, with basic and medium levels of education (around 31% and 34% respec-
tively) and lower and medium levels of household income (approximately 33% and 33%
respectively). The household is composed, on average, of two adults and one child. All
variables are categorical except for the members of adults and children in the household.
Information about household income and education are captured by a group of dichoto-
mous variables, where the reference variables for each group are low income and none
and basic education. We now turn to a discussion of the main variables of interest.
TABLE 3.3: Descriptive statistics: demographic characteristics
Measures Total Male Female
Income levels
Low income (up to £1000) .414 (.493) .405 (.491) .419 (.494)
Medium income (£1001 to £2000) .406 (.491) .393 (.489) .415 (.493)
High income (over £2000) .166 (.373) .187 (.391) .153 (.361)
Education levels
None .133 (.340) .158 (.365) .119 (.323)
Basic (O-levels) .346 (.476) .280 (.449) .386 (.487)
Medium (A-levels + Technical education) .377 (.485) .406 (.491) .360 (.480)
Higher (Undergraduate + Postgraduate degrees) .166 (.373) .156 (.363) .136 (.343)
#Adults in the household 2.19 (1.05) 2.14 (1.08) 2.21 (1.04)
#Children in the household .924 (1.11) .636 (.989) 1.07 (1.14)
Observations 1541 583 958
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. Monthly household income includes any benefits.
Low income and none and basic education will be used as benchmark categorical variables.
Self-disconnection and Emergency Credit. Table 3.4 shows our measures of self-
disconnection and emergency credit. At least 62% of the sample stated that had already
used the emergency credit and around 37% had already self-disconnected at some point.
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TABLE 3.4: Distribution of emergency credit and self-disconnection
Answer Freq. Percent. Cum.
Emergency Credit (stated), redefined
To what extent do you agree with the following statement:
I rarely use the emergency credit.
(0) Strongly agree, agree 550 38.38 38.38
(1) Strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree 883 61.62 100
Total 1,433 100
Self-disconnection (stated), redefined
To what extent do you agree with the following statement:
Sometimes the emergency credit runs out.
(0) Strongly disagree, disagree 828 60.61 60.61
(1) Strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree 538 36.77 100
Total 1,366 100
Notes: The variables are redefined since the original ones are in a scale from “Strongly
agree” to “Strongly disagree”, including a “Don’t know” option that was dropped in
the redefined variables.
Inconvenience of Top-up. A possible explanation for a household using the emer-
gency credit or self-disconnecting is that it is inconvenient to top-up, for example due to
transaction costs. Every time consumers need to top-up, they have to go to an outlet or
if the payment can be made through an online account, the consumers still need to have
access to internet. Other reasons may include liquidity constraints or lack of income.
In order to take into account this factor, we have asked the respondents to answer, on a
scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” including a “don’t know” option, the
sentence “Pay As You Go makes it easy to pay for my gas”. From this, we constructed
the binary variable inconvenience of top up that is zero if the customer had answered
“strongly agree” or “agree” to the question or one otherwise. In all redefined variables
throughout the analysis, the “don’t know” option was dropped. Interestingly, the majority
of the respondents have stated that a prepayment meter does make it easy to pay for gas
(see Table A2 for a cross-tabulation with self-disconnection).
Topping Up Behaviour. The consumers were asked to state whether they top up more
over the winter or roughly the same over the year. This is summarised in the variable top
up all year that equals to one if consumer i tops up roughly the same all year around and
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zero if consumer i tops up much more over the winter. The majority of the consumers
choose to top up according to their needs, and so their top-ups were more frequent over
the winter. From the consumers who top up roughly the same all year round, only 29%
had self-disconnected; whereas 40% of those who top up more during the winter had
already self-disconnected (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Although consumers who
self-impose a personal rule or internal commitment mechanism, such as topping up the
same every week, are less exposed to self-disconnection, there are still consumers that
top up regularly and self-disconnect. This suggests that current regular top-up behaviour
is not sufficient in preventing self-disconnection for all type of consumers.
Saving Behaviour. Consumers may have not been using the meter as a commitment
device via regular top-ups, but still saved for the increase in energy spending. One ques-
tion asked, on a scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”, was “When I’m using
less gas in warmer months I like to add any spare cash to my savings”. 24% of the con-
sumers that answered this question, answered “strongly agree” or “agree” against 76%
who answered “strongly disagree” or “disagree” or “neither agree nor disagree”. This
is a redefined variable: saving behaviour equals one if the customer answered “strongly
agree” or “agree” and zero otherwise. Moreover, the relationship between saving be-
haviour and self-disconnection is not statistically significant (see Table A4). This sug-
gests that consumers use the accumulated savings during the summer for expenses other
than energy.
Spare Cash. Self-disconnection is associated with poverty. Following Bryan et
al. (2010), behavioural anomalies significantly affect consumers with less disposable
income. At this point, a relevant question is: do low-income consumers who self-
disconnect have the opportunity to accumulate savings during the summer? When an-
swering the question “I have spare cash in warmer months as I don’t have to spend so
much on gas”, 20% of the consumers who have answered “strongly agree” or “agree”
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are in the low-income category (see Table A5). Eight percent out of those 20% had al-
ready self-disconnected. Consequently, a proportion of low-income consumers affected
by self-disconnection also had opportunities to use a commitment contract. Banerjee and
Mullainathan (2010) argue that low-income people consume relatively more temptation
goods. Temptation and self-control problems affect both the rich and the poor though
they influence and/or matter more for the poor. Therefore, through the decrease of temp-
tation and increase in self-control, one may induce greater savings.
Self-control. We constructed a measure to assess the level of goal achievement of
the individuals as a proxy for self-control. Psychologists have considered the impact
of conscientiousness on self-control and goal achievement can be seen as one facet of
conscientious trait (see the literature on the Big Five personality traits, e.g. Costa and
Widiger 1994). We decided to focus on goal achievement since it is the most relevant
facet of conscientious trait in explaining self-control in the context of self-disconnection.
Due to the limit number of questions in the survey, we have a single question to assess
goal achievement and thus, our question does not assess completely goal achievement
but rather focuses on goal task, planning and procrastination issues.
Which of the following statements best describe you? (Choose two responses at most)
a) I usually achieve my goals.
b) I usually avoid or delay a task that requires a lot of thinking.
c) I have difficulties in completing a task that requires organization.
d) I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve.
e) I don’t usually achieve my goals.
In order to construct an index for “goal achievement” from this question, we delin-
eated three different levels: high, medium, and low goal achievement (see Table A6 in the
Appendix). Individuals who usually achieve their goals (answered point a) have a high
level of goal achievement. In contrast, individuals who usually do not achieve their goals
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(e) are seen as having a low level of goal achievement. The intermediate concept targets
those individuals who have difficulties in achieving their goals (b, c and d). The ma-
jority of the respondents, 63%, answered one option only. However, respondents could
select two options, and so we need to define a rule to divide the answers between the
three subsets (high, medium and low). Those that have answered options (a) and (d) are
considered as high because (d) is stronger in terms of goal achievement than (b) or (c),
whereas those that have answered (a) and (b) or (a) and (c) are considered as medium.
These answers represent so far 90% of the total answers for this question. The remaining
answers that have included (e) are considered as low type. Overall, the majority of the
respondents (around 60%) are considered as high goal achievement types against 10%
of the sample that were considered as low goal achievement and 30% as medium goal
achievement.
This index has a major limitation for firms and/or decision makers since information
on attitudes, personality traits and/or behaviour is generally not available. In order to
better understand how the information on goal achievement correlates with other easily
observable variables, we conducted a correlation analysis (see Table 3.5).
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Interestingly, education is related only to the extremes with the other variables. There
is a negative correlation between basic education and high goal achievement and a neg-
ative correlation between high education and low goal achievement. Additionally, high
goal achievement is significant negatively correlated with low income and female. The
former result deserves special attention because those consumers that have low goal
achievement levels and are low-income are precisely those consumers that can take ad-
vantage of a commitment contract. The latter correlation is more ambiguous since it
might be explained either because female respondents in our sample have lower levels of
goal achievement when compared to male respondents or because female reported goal
achievement in a less confident manner. Nevertheless, the magnitude of correlation is
quite small, around 9%.
Further, we find that self-disconnection is significant negatively correlated with a high
goal achievement. This is relevant in light of the discussion above that self-disconnection
is affected by cognitive biases. In fact, this finding seems to clearly identify those con-
sumers who do not need a commitment contract or a reminder, thus our non-target group
of consumers. We also find a positive and statistically significant relationship between
self-disconnection and medium goal achievement. Given this positive correlation, it can-
not be said that these consumers are truly consistent and one can say that there is a sign
that these consumers lack self-control. But the question is, will these consumers accept
a commitment contract? Are they sophisticated enough to be aware of their lack of self-
control? We have introduced a question in the survey that we will use to inspect this point
in the next section: “To what extent do you agree with the following statement, on a scale
from strongly disagree to strongly agree: I get worried about running out of credit”. In
fact, 52% of those that have answered “strongly agree” or “agree” in this question and
have been considered as medium goal achievement, have already self-disconnected.
A further relevant question is: assuming that those respondents with medium goal
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achievement levels are a good proxy for those consumers that would accept a commit-
ment contract, how could a firm identify them without the availability of information on
self-control? Table A8 in the Appendix shows the mean characteristics of those respon-
dents that were indexed as medium goal achievement. These respondents are more likely
to be between 34 and 54 years old, to have low and medium levels of income, to have
basic and medium education and top-up more during the winter. Table A7 and A9 show
the mean characteristics of those respondents that were indexed as low and high goal
achievement, respectively.
Saving Plans. Table 3.6 shows the distribution of the choices that consumers made
with regard to the commitment contracts that were introduced in the previous section
and the reminder. Interestingly, when asked to choose between the different commitment
contracts, the reminder or none, 36% of the consumers have chosen the regular payments
throughout the year, followed by almost 15% choosing the reminder option whereas the
voluntary savings and the summer fixed payments received least interest.
TABLE 3.6: Distribution of the different plans
Preferred saving plan Freq. Percent Cum.
Regular payments 457 36.44 36.44
Voluntary savings 106 8.45 44.9
Ad-hoc payments 131 10.45 55.34
Summer fixed payments 47 3.75 59.09
Reminder 187 14.91 74
None of the above 326 26 100
Total 1,254 100




First, our survey is designed to identify the type of consumers that would accept a com-
mitment contract and/or a reminder. In order to increase consumer surplus, we need to
target those consumers who actually need a commitment contract because, even though
their costs of self-disconnection exceed the benefits, self-control issues constrain their
ability to make a strictly rational choice predisposing them to relatively costly self-
disconnection. For that purpose, we need to understand what are the determinants of
self-disconnection. Second, we wish to know whether our proposed commitment con-
tracts would be accepted by energy consumers and, if so, which contract they would
prefer.
Testing for self-control problems in self-disconnection. It will be desirable to
model stated emergency credit, eci, and stated self-disconnection, sdi, at once in a seem-
ingly unrelated regression set-up in which the dependent variables are generated by pro-
cesses that are independent except for the correlated errors. Let us assume that stated
emergency credit for individual i is identified by the latent variable ec⇤i and that sd⇤i is










1 if ec⇤i > 0
0 otherwise.
The second model becomes:
sd
⇤
i = ↵1x1i +↵2x2i + ↵3GAli + ↵4GAmi + µ2i, (3.2)








1 if sd⇤i > 0
0 otherwise.
where x1i represents a vector of demographic and economic characteristics and x2i
represents a vector of variables that may help explaining self-disconnection. In the latter
vector, we have included top up all year, saving behaviour, and inconvenience of top
up. To measure self-control, we use our levels of goal achievement as dummy variables
and use high goal achievement as a reference category in our estimations: GAli = 1 if
low goal achievement and zero otherwise; GAmi = 1 if medium goal achievement and
zero otherwise; and GAhi = 1 if high goal achievement and zero otherwise. The error


























where ⇢ captures the correlation in the error terms between self-disconnection and
emergency credit.
Can we identify sophisticated and/or naïve consumers? A possible indication of
this identification of types is to see whether consumers that have a low and/or medium
levels of goal achievement are more likely to worry about running out of gas than the
consumers with high goal achievement. A consumer can be worried about running out
of credit for several reasons, but an interesting one is that they may already self-ration or
even self-disconnect, and they are aware of their self-control issues. Thus, we expect that
a sophisticated consumer is more likely to be worried about running out of gas, whereas
the naïve is overconfident. We can use the dummy variable worried, that equals one if
consumer i has “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement “I get worried about
running out of credit”, and zero otherwise. We use this dummy as a binary dependent
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variable in the following equation.
worriedi = ⇡0 + ⇡1x1i + ⇡2GAli + ⇡3GAmi + ⇠i, (3.3)
In order to test this hypothesis, we estimated a probit model where worried is the de-
pendent variable; as explanatory variables we included a vector of demographic, includ-
ing gender and economic variables and goal achievement. ⇠i is a stochastic disturbance.
Preferred Saving Plan. In the second step of our analysis, we show a theoretical
framework for consumers choosing a certain commitment device. A consumer i is faced
with a choice between the following alternatives or plans: (1) regular payments through-
out year, (2) voluntary savings target, (3) ad-hoc extra payments, (4) summer fixed extra
payments, (5) reminder, (6) none of the options.
Following the additive random utility model for multiple alternatives (see Cameron




i j + ✏ij, j = 1, ..., 6, (3.4)
where Uij represents the utility of consumer i of a plan j. ✏ij is the random component
of utility that stands for the consumers unobserved characteristics.  j is a vector of
alternative-specific parameters.
Each consumer decision is based on choosing the plan that offers the highest utility
level. A certain consumer i chooses plan j if the utility derived from it is higher than the
utility that he had derived from choosing “none of the options” and from all other plans,
Uij   Uis, for all j 6= s. The choice s, “none of the options”, is used as the reference
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choice. Then, the probability for customer i to choose plan j is given by
Pr (PPi = j) = Pr (Uij   Uis, 8j 6= s)
= Pr (x
0
i j + ✏ij   x
0





i s   ✏is   ✏ij, 8j 6= s).
(3.5)
We assume that the errors ✏ij are i.i.d. type-one extreme value, with density
f(✏ij) = e
 ✏ij
exp( e ✏ij), j = 1, ..., 6.









. The model then takes
the following form:
Pr (PPi = j) = F ( 0j + 1jx1i+ 2jx2i+ 3jsdi+ 4jGAli+ 5jGAmi+ ✏ij), (3.6)
where PPi represents a customer decision about plan j. As before, x1i represents a
vector of demographic and economic characteristics and x2i includes inconvenience of
top up and saving behaviour. This is estimated using a multinomial logit (MNL). By
estimating equation (3.6) using a MNL model, we examine the direct impact of self-
disconnection, goal achievement, inconvenience of top up, saving behaviour and indi-
vidual socioeconomic characteristics on the probability of choosing between one of the
commitment contracts, or the reminder against the reference category of not choosing
any of the listed options.
The MNL has some limitations. The most criticised component of the MNL lies in
its property known as independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This property states
that the ratio of the probabilities of choosing one alternative over another, with both
alternatives having a non-zero probability of choice, is not affected by the presence or
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absence of any additional alternatives in the choice set (Louviere et al. 2000). This
assumption is quite strong and in fact, it may not hold, for example when two or more
alternatives are closer substitutes than the other alternatives. The Hausman test and the
Small-Hsiao test are the standard procedures to test whether the IIA property in the MNL
is violated.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Self-disconnection and Emergency Credit
Estimation results for emergency credit and self-disconnection are obtained by estimating
equations (3.1) and (3.2) through a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model. Table 3.7
reports the average marginal effects and conditional probabilities. The two equations are
statistically significantly correlated (⇢ = 0.258). This result implies that the error terms
of both equations are correlated and we gain a more efficient estimator by estimating the
two equations jointly compared to estimating them separately.
Although income is significant in the emergency credit model, i.e. a lower income
level increases the probability of using emergency credit; the same is not applied in the
self-disconnection model. Education does not seem to affect the use of emergency credit
or the tendency to self-disconnect. The inconvenience of top-up increases the predicted
probability to self-disconnect by around 15%; whereas top up all year decreases the
predicted probability of using the emergency credit and of self-disconnection by around
16%.7 A regular top up seems to be effective in reducing self-disconnection, however, as
discussed in the previous sections, it does not completely offset it. Saving behaviour (i.e.
7Notice that these are categorical variables and so, the marginal effects show how the probability of
stated self-disconnection and stated emergency credit change as the categorical variable, e.g. inconvenience
of top-up, changes from 0 to 1.
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being more prone to save) affects significantly and negatively the use of emergency credit
but is not significantly associated with self-disconnection. This emphasises the finding in
the previous section that self-imposing a commitment mechanism such as saving during
warmer months is not sufficient in minimising self-disconnection.
Result 1. A self-commitment device such as saving during warmer months is not
sufficient in minimising self-disconnection.
We also find a significant relationship between goal achievement and self-disconnection.
Note that we have used as a reference category the high level of goal achievement. Thus,
moving from the high category to the medium one increases the predicted probability of
self-disconnection by 10.6%. This emphasises our next result, that self-control, measured
through goal achievement, plays a role in self-disconnection.
Result 2. Self-control plays a role in self-disconnection.
We control for self-control problems only in equation (3.2) since the use of emergency
credit is not related to self-control issues. A household can use the emergency credit
because it simply forgot to top up, or it may even be the case that the emergency credit
is being used as a short small “loan” since it involves no interest payment, and hence its
use is rational.
The last column reports the conditional predicted probability of self-disconnection
given that emergency credit has been used. These effects are similar to the average
marginal effects of self-disconnection, including the statistical significance of the vari-
ables. The reverse conditional probability does not make sense in our case because self-
disconnection mostly happens once emergency credit runs out.
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TABLE 3.7: Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit: emergency credit and
self-disconnection
Seemingly unrelated Average marginal effects Conditional Probability
bivariate probit Emergency Credit Self-disconnection Pr(sd = 1 | ec = 1)
Age
35 to 44 .055 -.092 -.104
(.087) (.085) (.087)
45 to 54 .028 -.076 -.084
(.084) (.082) (.083)
55 to 64 -.027 -.080 -.080
(.088) (.086) (.090)
Over 65 -.093 -.166 -.161
(.100) (.102) (.104)
Female -.011 .008 .010
(.037) (.038) (.040)
Education
Medium .049 .020 .014
(.037) (.038) (.039)
Higher .020 .006 .004
(.050) (.053) (.055)
Income
Medium .112*** -.001 -.019
(.037) (.038) (.039)
High .059 -.028 -.004
(.050) (.051) (.039)
Household adults .029* .025 .022
(.017) (.017) (.018)
Saving behavior -.124*** .010 .029
(.039) (.040) (.042)
Top up all year -.177*** -.162*** -.144**
(.057) (.062) (.064)











Prob >  2 .000
Observations 787
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Standard errors calculated by the Delta method
are in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significant levels, respectively. LL
stands for log likelihood. Age under 22 and Age to 34, none and low education, low income
and high goal achievement were used as reference categories.
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Robustness Check. The model above relies greatly on the definition of the depen-
dent variables. We tested the same model, seemingly unrelated bivariate probit, using a
different definition of the dependent variables, self-disconnection and emergency credit,
by dropping the “neither agree nor disagree” category. Table A10 reports the results. No
sign and/or statistically significant changes happened in terms of emergency credit, only
in terms of the magnitude of the coefficients. Regarding the self-disconnection model,
the sign and significance of the main explanatory variables did not suffer change. The
similarity between the models with the two different definitions suggests that our former
definition is correct.
We also tested a seemingly unrelated bivariate ordered probit model. This estimation
method also allows for correlation between the latent variables underlying the two depen-
dent variables, even after controlling for observables. However, the latent variables are
ordered in a scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree (“don’t know" answer is re-
garded as a missing value). Table A10 shows that the results remain significantly similar
to the coefficients obtained through the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model.
3.6.2 Worried
Table 3.8 shows the average marginal effects obtained through the probit estimation of
equation (3.3). The low explanatory power (pseudo R2) of the model suggests that factors
other than those considered account for worried. This can also be explained by missing
data. Therefore, a carefully analysis of the predicted probabilities should be considered.
Interestingly, low goal achievement increases the predicted probability of becoming
worried about running out of credit. Moving from the high category to the low one
increases the predicted probability of being worried by 22.7% in the first column model.
This shows signs of awareness among those consumers who feel that they might run out
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of gas. Those consumers who know that they will not self-disconnect have no reason
to be worried and so represent those consumers that we do not want to target with a
commitment contract, or even a reminder. Nevertheless, this analysis is not sufficient to
clearly identify sophisticated consumers and naïve consumers in our sample especially
because naïve consumers tend to be overconfident and therefore, might have overstated
their true level of goal achievement.
In the second column we add top up all year which leads to an improvement (i.e. the
log-pseudo likelihood decreases around 4 points and the pseudo R2 increases by 0.008
points). Trivially, a consumer that tops up throughout the year is less worried about run-
ning out of gas. Low goal achievement and medium goal achievement are still statistically
significant in this model.
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TABLE 3.8: Probit: self-control variables on worried

























Pseudo R2 .036 .044
Observations 878 878
Log-pseudo likelihood -517.78 -513.23
Prob >  2 .000 .000
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***,
**, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significant
levels. Percent correctly predicted: 70.05. Age
under 22 and Age to 34, none and low education,
low income and high goal achievement were used
as reference categories. aCoefficient estimates.
Age categorical variables are here omitted.
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3.6.3 Preferred Saving Plan
Though a significant percentage (around 36%) of consumers have chosen regular pay-
ments saving plan as their preferred option, as it is shown in Table 3.6, plenty of com-
ments expressed some concern about the lack of flexibility. Thus, we will investigate
deeper which type of customer chooses each plan.
Table 3.9 shows the estimation results for the choice of the preferred saving plan. All
the saving plans are compared to the “none of the options” choice. We find that a higher
age reduces the likelihood of choosing a saving plan (with the exception of the summer
fixed payments plan, which is not statistically significant). Keeping all other variables at
their means, the predicted probability of choosing a regular payment plan is 1.7% higher
for those that had already self-disconnected and around 16% higher for those who find
PPMs of not make it easier to pay. This contrasts with ad-hoc payments since having
self-disconnection decreases the predicted probability of choosing ad-hoc payments.
For both plans regular payment and reminder, a higher income leads to a greater like-
lihood of choosing a saving plan instead of none. These results also suggest a relationship
between self-disconnection and saving plans, which leads to the following result.
Result 3. A household that stated that it had already self-disconnected has a higher
probability of accepting a commitment device, especially for the contract with summer
fixed payments.
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TABLE 3.9: Multinomial logit: preferred plan (base comparison: “None
of the options”)
Average Marginal Effects, Regular Voluntary Ad-hoc Summer fixed Reminder
Multinomial Logit payments savings payments payments
Age
45 to 54 -.058 -.013 -.020 .038** .008
(.044) (.025) (.027) (.014) (.034)
55 to 64 -.073* .004 -.051* .006 .053
(.050) (.028) (.032) (.020) (.036)
65 over -.144** -.068* -.050* .039 .093
(.079) (.053) (.049) (.019) (.051)
Education
Medium -.053 .007 -.034* .006 .030
(.040) (.022) (.025) (.010) (.029)
Higher -.092 -.018 -.011 .005 .087
(.054) (.033) (.034) (.014) (.035)
Income
Medium .083** -.048 -.015 .002 .045**
(.040) (.023) (.024) (.011) (.029)
High .094 -.014 -.079 .006 .020
(.051) (.028) (.037) (.013) (.039)
Self-disconnection .017* .014 -.007 .019** .026*
(.037) (.021) (.024) (.010) (.027)
Inconvenience of top up .164*** .004* -.023 -.005 -.018
(.038) (.025) (.026) (.010) (.029)
Saving Behaviour .009 .004 -.004 .024** -.039
(.043) (.025) (.027) (.010) (.033)
Goal Achievement
Low -.073 -.021 .050 .023 .014
(.063) (.038) (.033) (.014) (.045)
Medium .008 .019 -.029 .005 .011
(.040) (.022) (.027) (.011) (.029)
Constanta .353 -.816*** -.184 -3.97*** -.984***




Prob >  2 .000
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Standard errors calculated by the Delta method are
in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significant levels, respectively and the
standard errors are in parenthesis. LL stands for log likelihood. “None of the options” is the base
outcome. Age under 22, Age to 34 and Age to 44, none and low education, low income and high
goal achievement were used as reference categories. aCoefficient estimates.
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The Small-Hsiao test and the Hausman test of IIA assumption were computed and
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of non-violation of IIA.
Overall, the above results demonstrate that there is scope to introduce a commitment
contract. We show that an internal commitment/self-commitment device is not suffi-
cient in eliminating self-disconnections. We find that a consumer/household who has
already experienced self-disconnection has a greater probability of accepting a commit-
ment contract. Although our multinomial logit model did not show a significant impor-
tance of our measure of self-control as a predictor of the different types of commitment
contract and/or reminder, we find that self-control has a great importance in predicting
self-disconnection.
3.7 Discussion
Both low-income households and households revealing that they have already suffered
from self-disconnection deserve special attention. Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show the choices
made by these two groups of households. For both groups, households prefer a regular
payment throughout the year. Around 89 consumers who had self-disconnected pre-
ferred not to have a saving plan. One reason for this is that these consumers may be
unaware of their self-control issues. In fact, 46% (35 out of 89) of the respondents that
answered “none of the options” have self-disconnected, but also have stated that they usu-
ally achieve their goals. This shows a certain sign of naiveté. The reminder could help
these consumers to be more aware of potential self-control issues and/or likely increases
in consumption during the winter.
The other explanation, which may explain it, is a failure to understand the saving
plan. In fact, 40% (41 out 89) of the respondents that answered “none of the options”
have self-disconnected and have no or low education levels. This shows us that there is
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a need to explain the different saving plans more clearly and to use less formal educated
language so as to reach all consumers.
A further explanation is that these 89 consumers may face extreme financial con-
straints and the complete lack of spare cash makes a saving plan not possible. In fact,
37% (33 out of 89) of the respondents that answered “none of the options” have self-
disconnected and have low income.
TABLE 3.10: Cross tabulation: preferred saving plan vs. low-income
Preferred saving plan
Regular Voluntary Ad-hoc Summer fixed Reminder None Total
payments savings payments payments
Low inc. 0 252 43 59 26 96 127 603
1 142 44 51 14 53 115 419
Total 394 87 110 40 149 242 1,022
Notes: Pearson chi2(5) = 15.2764 (p = .009).
TABLE 3.11: Cross tabulation: preferred saving plan vs. self-
disconnection
Preferred saving plan
Regular Voluntary Ad-hoc Summer fixed Reminder None Total
payments savings payments payments
Self-disc. 0 245 54 75 20 95 206 695
1 178 41 48 20 74 89 450
Total 423 95 123 40 169 295 1,145
Notes: Pearson chi2(5) = 15.6226 (p = .008).
Chapter 3. Addressing self-disconnection among prepayment energy consumers: A
behavioural approach
91
Overall, consumers are interested in a saving plan and in general they agree that it
would be a good way to spread the cost of seasonal changes in gas use.8 We find that
those households stating they have already self-disconnected would like to commit to a
saving plan. When asked specifically about their preferred plan, a significant percent-
age of the consumers have chosen the regular payments saving plan as their preferred
option, although many respondents commented on the lack of flexibility. In the survey,
consumers could leave any comments with regards to the saving plans. The consumers
showed some concerns regards to loss of flexibility, lack of spare cash, possible increases
on the gas prices, loss of the interest during the summer, likelihood to forget to save, and
also mistrust from the profit-maximising firm.
Moreover, consumers understand that a commitment contract can help them to control
their gas bills, but do not fully understand the possibility of positive synergies in terms of
avoiding temptations to spend on things that they do not need.
Based on our findings, we would choose a commitment contract that shares some
of the characteristics of the regular payments, while allowing for a greater flexibility.
For example, the customer can make extra payments when they prefer/can, but at the
beginning of each summer the energy firm suggests an equal weekly/monthly amount
(based on the previous year’s consumption) that the customer can meet in order to smooth
consumption through the year.
8Consumers were asked to answer in a scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” the following
statements about their preferred saving plan: “It would be a good way to spread the cost of seasonal changes
in gas use.”; “It would help me focus on budgeting to cover my gas needs.”; “It sounds too complicated.”;
“I’d worry about losing the credit I had saved.”; and “It could help me reduce my spending on non-essential
purchases”.




In this paper, we designed different contracts to be offered by an energy firm that involve
a commitment from the consumer. These contracts differ in terms of flexibility and sav-
ing target. We proposed also a reminder for consumers who do not wish to commit to
a specific plan that involves savings, either because they do not think that they need it,
although some of them might actually need it, or because they do not wish to commit to
one firm. These interventions, under certain conditions, can lead to an increase in con-
sumer surplus. Among these conditions are the correct identification of those consumers
who need a commitment device and the “no introduction of extra switching costs” for the
consumer of either changing tariff or firm. If overall firm costs also decrease as a result
of our proposed mechanism, then there are compelling reasons to believe that our mech-
anism can lead to an increase in social welfare. Nevertheless, a deeper welfare analysis
would need to be undertaken before reaching such a conclusion.
It is ambiguous whether an increase of the awareness of self-control issues can have
an impact on other expenditures other than energy. Further, the empirical part of the study
has a major limitation: we relied exclusively on a self-reported questionnaire. These
limitations suggest that future research should experimentally test the effectiveness of a
commitment contract and feedback/reminder to PPM gas consumers. A follow-up survey
could then test whether there are any spillover effects of other types of expenditure.
Our analysis has implications for the policy debate on the role of the prepayment
smart meter in the context of fuel poverty. This link to poverty emphasises the impor-
tance of the present study in providing specific and simple solutions to increase levels of
energy comfort. The solution proposed in this paper does not demand any costs to the
government, and, is likely to increase social welfare.
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TABLE A1: List of main variables
Variable Detailed Description
Age Age of respondent. Categorical ordered variable.
Female Dummy for the gender of the respondent, Female=1 and Male otherwise.
#adults household No. persons with more than 16 years old in the household.
#children household No. children in the household with less or equal to 16 years old.
Household size No. people in the household
Household income Household monthly income, including any benefits.
Low =1 if household monthly income is up to £1000, and =0, otherwise.
Medium =1 if household monthly income is £1001 to £2000, and =0, otherwise.
High =1 if household monthly income is over £2000, and =0, otherwise.
Education Education level of the respondent.
None =1 if highest education obtained is lower than basic, and =0, otherwise.
Basic (O-levels) =1 if the highest degree is basic education, and =0, otherwise.
Medium (A-levels & vocational) =1 if the highest degree is medium education, and =0, otherwise.
Higher (University degree) =1 if the highest degree is higher education, and =0, otherwise.
Emergency credit (stated) To what extent do you agree with the statement:
I rarely use the emergency credit.
Strongly disagree=1, to Strongly agree=5.
Redefined into dummy variable. =1 if ec=1 or =2 or =3, and =0, otherwise.
Self-disconnection (stated) To what extent do you agree with the statement:
Sometimes the emergency credit runs out.
Strongly disagree=1, to Strongly agree=5.
Redefined into dummy variable: =1 if sd=5 or =4 or =3, and =0, otherwise.
Top up all year Which of the statements is most applicable to your spend on gas over the year?
=0 if “I top up more on my gas meter over the winter than over the summer.”
=1 if “I top up roughly the same all year around.”
Saving behaviour To what extent do you agree with:
When I’m using less gas in warmer months,
I like to add any spare cash to my savings.
Strongly disagree=1 to Strongly agree=5.
Redefined into dummy variable. =1 if =5 or =4, and =0 otherwise.
Inconvenience of top up To what extent do you agree with:
Pay As You Go makes it easy to pay for my gas.
Strongly disagree=1, to Strongly agree=5.
Redefined into dummy variable. =1 if =1 or =2 or =3, and =0 otherwise.
Preferred Plan (PP) Binary Variable. Regular payment throughout the year=1,
Voluntary savings target=2, Ad-hoc extra payments=3,
Summer fixed extra payments=4, Reminder on consumption=5, None=6
Worried To what extent do you agree with:
I’d worry about losing the credit I had saved.
Strongly disagree=1 to Strongly agree=5.
Redefined into dummy variable. =1 if =5 or =4, and =0 otherwise.
Spare Cash To what extent do you agree with:
I have spare cash in warmer months as I don’t have to spend so much on gas.
Strongly disagree=1 to Strongly agree=5.
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Inconvenience of top up, redefined
0 616 306 922
45.46% 22.58% 68.04%
1 203 230 433
14.98% 16.97% 31.96%
Total 819 536 1,355
60.44% 39.56% 100%
Notes: Pearson chi2(1) = 48.9422 (p = 0.000).




Top up all year
0 732 499 1231
53.59% 36.53% 90.12%
1 96 39 135
7.03% 2.86% 9.88%
Total 828 538 1,366
60.61% 39.39% 100%
Notes: Pearson chi2(1) = 6.9132 (p = 0.009).





0 507 316 823
46.34% 28.88% 75.23%
1 154 117 271
14.08% 10.69% 24.77%
Total 661 433 1094
60.42% 39.58% 100%
Notes: Pearson chi2(1) = 1.9457 (p = 0.163). The relation be-
tween saving behaviour and self-disconnection is not statistically sig-
nificance.
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0 312 258 570
25.68% 21.23% 46.91%
1 400 245 645
32.92% 20.16% 53.09%
Total 712 503 1215
58.6% 41.4% 100%
Notes: Pearson chi2(1) = 6.6079 (p = 0.010).
Sample of question on saving plan choice
The following questions relate to how the payment plan may work and we are looking
for your thoughts on what would be the most beneficial / easy to use. Before entering onto
the payment plan, you would need to agree to a tailored quote detailing your consumption
patterns and spend over the year - this would help you understand how you might manage
the cost of your gas with different saving options that suit your lifestyle and income.
Some of these options have been listed below and we’d like to know how these sound to
you.
The following options are variants of the savings plan. We’d like to know how these
saving plans A to E appeal to you. Please rate 1 - 5 where 1 is not appealing and 5 is
extremely appealing.
A) Regular payments throughout year
Based on the summary of your previous year’s consumption, you agree to an equal
weekly / monthly amount that you commit to paying through the year. Regular
equal payments would cover your consumption throughout the year.
B) Voluntary Savings Target
You chose a target amount that you feel comfortable / confident in saving. You’re
responsible for meeting this target and it would be up to you whether or not you
achieved your target each month. The credit you saved would be used to offset
your winter consumption.
C) Ad-hoc Extra Payments
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You make additional payments as and when you can afford to do so. You would
not have to nominate a target for your savings but the more you saved, the more of
your winter consumption would be offset.
D) Summer Fixed Extra Payments
You commit to additional fixed payments just during summer months. These ad-
ditional payments would be calculated on the basis of your winter time gas con-
sumption in the previous year. The extra payments would be used to cover your
higher gas payments in the wintertime.
E) Feedback on Consumption
Without changing your monthly payment plan, you receive regular feedback in the
summer about your average gas payments. For example: “Last year you spent £20
on gas between July and September and you spent £120 on gas between October
and December”.
From the options listed in the question above which savings plan would you prefer?
Choose one option only:
A) Regular payments throughout year
B) Voluntary Savings Target
C) Ad-hoc Extra Payments
D) Summer Fixed Extra Payments
E) Feedback on Consumption
F) None of the above
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TABLE A6: Distribution of goal achievement questions
Answer Freq. Percent Percent
over all variables over groups
Goal achievement
High
I usually achieve my goals 409 35.2 58.8
I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve 287 24.7 41.2
and I usually achieve my goals
Total 696 59.9 100.0
Medium
I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve 184 15.8 52.9
I have difficulties in completing a task that requires organization 31 2.7 8.9
I usually avoid or delay a task that requires a lot of thinking 68 5.9 19.5
I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve 7 0.6 2.0
and I have difficulties in completing a task that requires organization
I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve 21 1.8 6.0
and I usually avoid or delay a task that requires a lot of thinking
I have difficulties in completing a task that requires organization 5 0.4 1.4
Iand I usually achieve my goals
I usually avoid or delay a task that requires a lot of thinking 32 2.8 9.2
and I usually achieve my goals
Total 348 30 100.0
Low
I don’t usually achieve my goals 34 2.9 29.1
I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve 17 1.5 14.5
and I don’t usually achieve my goals
I have difficulties in completing a task that requires organization 17 1.5 14.5
and I don’t usually achieve my goals
I have difficulties in completing a task that requires organization 27 2.3 23.1
and I usually avoid or delay a task that requires a lot of thinking
I don’t usually achieve my goals 18 1.6 15.4
and I usually avoid or delay a task that requires a lot of thinking
I don’t usually achieve my goals and I usually achieve my goals 4 0.3 3.4
Total 117 10.1 100.0
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TABLE A7: Low Goal Achievement: mean characteristics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 117 0.56 0.50 0 1
Age
21 and Under 117 0.00 0.00 0 0
22 to 34 117 0.32 0.47 0 1
35 to 44 117 0.24 0.43 0 1
45 to 54 117 0.39 0.49 0 1
55 to 64 117 0.28 0.45 0 1
65 and Over 117 0.05 0.22 0 1
Top-up all year 117 0.09 0.28 0 1
Income
Low 92 0.46 0.50 0 1
Medium 97 0.38 0.49 0 1
High 97 0.13 0.34 0 1
Education
None 108 0.17 0.37 0 1
Basic 108 0.39 0.49 0 1
Medium 108 0.36 0.48 0 1
High 108 0.08 0.28 0 1
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TABLE A8: Medium Goal Achievement: mean characteristics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 348 0.72 0.45 0 1
Age
21 and Under 348 0.00 0.05 0 1
22 to 34 348 0.29 0.45 0 1
35 to 44 348 0.24 0.43 0 1
45 to 54 348 0.39 0.49 0 1
55 to 64 348 0.22 0.42 0 1
65 and Over 348 0.07 0.26 0 1
Top-up all year 348 0.09 0.28 0 1
Income
Low 287 0.45 0.50 0 1
Medium 290 0.40 0.49 0 1
High 290 0.14 0.35 0 1
Education
None 321 0.12 0.32 0 1
Basic 321 0.38 0.49 0 1
Medium 321 0.36 0.48 0 1
High 321 0.15 0.35 0 1
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TABLE A9: High Goal Achievement: mean characteristics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 696 0.59 0.49 0 1
Age
21 and Under 696 0.00 0.04 0 1
22 to 34 696 0.31 0.46 0 1
35 to 44 696 0.19 0.39 0 1
45 to 54 696 0.39 0.49 0 1
55 to 64 696 0.26 0.44 0 1
65 and Over 696 0.11 0.31 0 1
Top-up all year 696 0.11 0.31 0 1
Income
Low 582 0.38 0.49 0 1
Medium 593 0.42 0.49 0 1
High 593 0.18 0.39 0 1
Education
None 641 0.11 0.31 0 1
Basic 641 0.33 0.47 0 1
Medium 641 0.39 0.49 0 1
High 641 0.16 0.37 0 1
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TABLE A10: Robustness check: SUBOP and SUBP
SUBOP SUBP
Coefficients Average marginal effects
ec (ordered) sd (ordered) ec (redefined) sd (redefined)
Age
35 to 44 .040 -.083 .026 -.116
(.191) (.199) (.098) (.089)
45 to 54 -.019 -.062 .023 -.111
(.183) (.191) (.093) (.084)
55 to 64 -.146 -.119 -.075 -.119
(.192) (.200) (.097) (.088)
Over 65 -.299 -.287 -.122 -.220**
(.224) (.239) (.113) (.108)
Female .041 .054 -.025 .041
(.083) (.089) (.044) (.042)
Education
Medium .117 -.017 .022 .001
(.085) (.090) (.044) (.042)
Higher .040 -.011 .044 .013
(.115) (.121) (.060) (.056)
Income
Medium .151* .078 .099** .005
(.086) (.091) (.045) (.043)
High .120 -.072 .021 -.037
(.112) (.121) (.059) (.056)
Household adults .045 .042 .023 .018
(.038) (.040) (.020) (.019)
Saving behavior -.275*** .044 -.125*** -.019
(.092) (.098) (.047) (.045)
Top up all year -.415*** -.638*** -.196*** -.227***
(.131) (.153) (.066) (.072)
Inconvenience of top up .067 .415*** .036 .161***












Prob >  2 .000 .000
Notes: SUBOP stands for seemingly unrelated bivariate ordered probit and SUBP stands
for seemingly unrelated bivariate probit. In the SUBP, the dependent variables were rede-
fined by dropping the “neither agree nor disagree" option whereas in the SUBOP we did
not dropped this option in the dependent variables. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The
standard errors in the average marginal effects are calculated by the Delta method. ***,
**, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significant levels, respectively. LL stands for log like-
lihood. Age under 22 and Age to 34, none and low education, low income and high goal
achievement were used as reference categories.
